Expropriation in Argentina and Brazil: Theory and Practice by Rosenn, Keith S.
University of Miami Law School 
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository 
Articles Faculty and Deans 
1975 
Expropriation in Argentina and Brazil: Theory and Practice 
Keith S. Rosenn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Expropriation in Argentina and Brazil:
Theory and Practice
KEITH S. ROSENN*
Latin America is presently the repository of about $13.5 billion in U.S.
direct investment,' which is equivalent to about 43 percent of the total
gross investment of the region.2 With such a high percentage of their econ-
omies in foreign hands, the attitudes of Latin American nations towards
foreign capital are predictably ambivalent. There is deep resentment of
foreign economic domination and fear of overdependence, coupled with the
recognition that domestic investment and technology are insufficient for
speedy economic growth. Perennial balance of payments problems man-
date restrictions on the outflow of dividends and royalties, but substantial
reinvestment of retained earnings increases the amount of foreign owner-
ship, aggravating the dependency concern. This ambivalence tends to be
manifested in alternate cycles of wooing and eschewing foreign investment.
Given the extensive use of expropriation in Latin America as a legal
device for promoting socio-economic change, as well as the present spate
of expropriatory activity directed against foreign investment,' knowledge
of the protection given by Latin American domestic law to private property
is essential to an informed investment decision. Such knowledge is particu-
larly important in the Latin American context for three reasons: (1) since
the time of the formulation of the Calvo doctrine (c.1870), Latin Americans
have insisted that foreigners are entitled to no greater legal protection than
nationals; 5 (2) expropriation may require a "denial of justice" in the local
courts to trigger the host country's liability under U.S. Investment Guar-
*A.B., 1960, Amherst College; LL.B., 1963, Yale University. Professor of Law, Ohio State
University. This article was prepared as part of a project on expropriation for the ABA's
International Law Section, Committee on Inter-American Law. The author would like to
acknowledge the assistance of Jess Sandoval, a recent graduate of the Ohio State College of
Law, with the footnotes. Responsibility for the ideas expressed is solely that of the author.
1. Lupo, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1972, 53 SURvEY oF CUn"nr Bus. 20, 26 (U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Sept. 1973).
2. INrm-AhmucAN DEvEL PzmNT BANK, ECONOMIC A'D SocIA PROGRESS IN LwTIN A.mi cA
36 (1972) [author's calculation].
3. Expropriation is used throughout this article to refer to any compensable taking or
modification of private property rights through the government's exercise of sovereign powers.
As such, it is virtually synonomous with condemnation or eminent domain, and the terms
are here used interchangeably. No judgment about the adequacy of the compensation paid
or owed is implied.
4. See Wesley, Expropriation Challenge in Latin America: Prospects for Accord on Stan-
dards and Procedures, 46 TUL. L. REv. 232, 234-44 (1971).
5. See generally D. SHEA, THE CALvo CLAUSE (1955).
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anty Program;' and (3) the U.S. Government's refusal to bludgeon Latin
American governments into favorable resolution of investment disputes
through the use of devices like the Hickenlooper Amendment portends
even greater reliance on local judicial remedies.
This article will examine the constitutional and statutory provisions
regulating expropriation in Argentina and Brazil, which between them
account for more than one-fourth of all U.S. direct private investment in
Latin America.' Its purpose is to assess to what degree these provisions
have been and may continue to be effective safeguards of property rights.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL EMINENT DOMAIN REQUIREMENTS
The Constitutions of both Argentina and Brazil, heavily influenced by
the Constitution of the United States, have always provided, in essence,
that private property9 may only be taken for public use and upon payment
of just compensation. The 1853 Constitution of Argentina, which is still in
effect today, provides:
Property is inviolable, and no resident of the Nation may be
deprived of property without a judgment based upon law. Expro-
priation for public utility must be authorized by law and is sub-
ject to prior compensation. . . . The confiscation of property is
forever stricken from the Argentine Penal Code."'
Although the 1819 Constitution had required "just compensation,"" the
change in wording to "prior compensation" resulted in no dilution of com-
6. E.g., Investment Guaranty Agreement with Brazil, Feb. 6, 1965, [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1807,
T.I.A.S. No. 6327 (effective Sept. 17, 1965). This Agreement requires prior exhaustion of local
remedies before the United States can espouse an investor's claim. The Agreement also
stipulates that expropriation per se does not give rise to a question of public international
law between the two countries unless there has been a denial of justice. In ratifying the
Agreement, the Brazilian Senate added the reservation that "denial of justice" is "understood
to mean the non-existence of the regular courts, or of normal means of access to such courts;
refusal on the part of the competent authority to render a judicial decision in violation of
internal procedural law." Carl, Incentives for Private Investment in Brazil, 6 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 190, 248 (1967).
7. See Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4 INT'L LAW. 611 (1970); Rogers,
United States Investment in Latin America: A Critical Appraisal, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 246, 251.
52 (1971); Comment, Argentina and the Hickenlooper Amendment, 54 CALIF. L. Rzv. 2078
(1966).
8. See Lupo, supra note 1, at 26.
9. The constitutional concept of property is broadly defined in both Argentina and Brazil
to include any right or interest which has a legally recognized economic value. See S. LoZADA,
INSTrrucIONES DE DERECHO P0BLIco 249 (1966); 5 PONTES DE MIRANDA, COMENTARoS A CONSTI-
TuigAo DE 1967, at 364-66 (1968).
10. CoNsTrrucON art. 17 (1853, as amended 1866, 1898, 1957) (Argen.).
11. CONsTrrucION arts. 123 & 124 (1819) (Argen.).
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pensation requirements, for implicit in the Argentine juridical concept of
compensation is the requirement that it be "just."'2
From 1949 to 1956, the 1853 Constitution was temporarily supplanted
by Per6n's revised version. This 1949 Constitution displayed a markedly
different attitude towards private property. It emphasized the "social
function of ownership" and conspicuously deleted the adjective "invio-
lable" used to characterize property under its predecessor. However, the
requirement of prior compensation for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain was retained.1 3 Since the 1966 military revolt that brought
General Ongania to power, the 1853 Constitution has had one foot in legal
limbo." The Per6nist government has pushed it further into limbo by
convening a constitutent assembly in September of 1974 that is expected
to restore a number of the modifications established by the 1949 Per6nist
Constitution. 5
Brazil has had six constitutions, give or take one;"8 each has similarly
protected private property."7 The present Constitution provides:
12. Provincia de Santa Fe v. Nicchi, 268 Fallos 112, 114, [1967-I J.A. 115, 127 La Lay
164 (1967); Administraci6n Gral. de Vialidad National v. Fojticova de Feith, [1962-VI] J.A.
488, 490, 108 La Ley 685, 686 (Federal Chamber of Appeals of La Plata, en banc 1962) (vote
of Dr. Ferndndez del Casal); Gordillo, Argentina, in ExPRoPRuroN iN THE AMERICAS 11, 19-
20 (A. Lowenfeld ed. 1971).
13. CoNs~rrucsoN art. 38 (1949) (Argen.).
14. Article 3 of the Statute of the Argentine Revolution, [1966] Anuario 233, maintained
in force only those portions of the constitution which did not conflict with the goals enunci-
ated in the Act of the Argentine Revolution.
15. 7 LATN AmnlcA 415 (1973).
16. Two of Brazil's "constitutions" are somewhat dubious. The 1937 Constitution, a prod-
uct of the Vargas dictatorship, technically did not take effect until ratified by a plebiscite,
which was never held. But this technicality did not prevent Vargas from treating it as though
it were in effect. The 1967 Constitution, a product of the 1964 military revolution, was
reissued in its entirety (with a few significant changes in substance and many insignificant
changes in style) as a constitutional amendment in 1969. Some characterize the product as
the 1969 Constitution; others consider it the 1967 Constitution, as amended. The figure of
six arrived at in the text counts the 1937 Constitution but not the 1969 "amendment."
17. CONsTrrUsAo art. 179(22) (1824) (Braz.) provided:
The right of property is guaranteed in all its plenitude. If the public welfare,
legally verified, requires the use and employment of the property of a citizen, he
shall receive prior compensation for its value. The law shall define the cases in
which this unique exception shall apply and regulate the determination of com-
pensation.
CoNs~rrur co art. 72(17) (1891) (Braz.) provided:
The right of property is maintained in all its plentitude, except for expropriation
for necessity or public utility upon prior compensation.
CoNSTrrugAo art. 113(17) (1934) (Braz.) provided:
The right of property is guaranteed, but it may not be exercised against the
social or collective interest, as determined by law. Expropriation for neces-sity or
public utility shall be effected in accordance with law, upon prior and just com-
pensation.
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The right of property is guaranteed, except in case of expropria-
tion for public necessity or utility or social interest, in which
event prior and just compensation must be paid in cash, subject
to the provisions of Article 161 permitting the expropriated party
to accept payment in government bonds with an exact monetary
correction clause. In case of imminent public danger, the compe-
tent authorities may use private property, assuring compensation
to the owner at a later date."
Although the compensation must be both "prior" and "just," Brazilian
jurists and courts, like those of Argentina, have considered the adjective
"just" redundant. 9
II. STATUTORY REGULATION OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The Constitutional provisions of both Argentina and Brazil have been
fleshed out by detailed statutes regulating the operation of eminent do-
main. The Argentines regard expropriation as a mixture of private and
public law; hence the subject is regulated by both the federal and provin-
cial governments."0 While there are slight differences with respect to proce-
dure and compensation, the provincial constitutions and statutes dealing
with expropriation are quite similar to the federal provisions., However,
the provincial courts have tended to accord the condemnee slightly better
treatment than the federal courts.2 Although Brazil also has a federal
system, expropriation is governed by federal rather than state legislation.,3
CoNsTrruiqAo art. 122(14) (1937) (Braz.) provided in part:
The Constitution shall assure Brazilians and resident aliens the right to liberty,
individual security, and property in the following terms:
(14) the right to property except for expropriation for necessity or public
utility, upon prior compensation. Its subject matter and its limits will be defined
in the laws which regulate its exercise.
CONS'rrnqAo art. 141(16) (1946) (Braz.) provided:
The right of property is guaranteed, except in the case of expropriation for
necessity or public utility, or social interest, upon prior and just compensation in
cash.
18. CoNsTrrnqAo art. 153(22) (1967), as amended 1969 (Braz.).
19. See R. BARcELLOS DE MAGALHAES, TEORU E PRATIcA DA DESAPROPMAgAO 185-90 (1968).
20. Gordillo, supra note 12, at 17. However, the current trend in Argentine doctrine is to
regard expropriation as predominantly public law. G. Bidart Campos, Rgimen Constitu-
cional de la Expropiaci6n, 144 La Ley 953 (1971).
21. For a comparison of the federal expropriation law with that of the province of Buenos
Aires, see F. MANcuso, LEY GENERAL DE EXPROPIACIONEs No. 5708 DE LA PROVINCIA DE BUENOS
AIRES ANOTADA Y CONCORDADA CON LA LEY NACIONAL 13.264 (1963).
22. Gordillo, supra note 12, at 18.
23. Under the 1934 Constitution the states could legislate with respect to expropriation,
but only to complement or supplement federal legislation. This limited legislative compe-
tency was withdrawn in the 1946 Constitution. The 1967 Constitution has maintained the
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The basic Argentine and Brazilian condemnation statutes' in force on
the federal level are products of the Per6n and Vargas dictatorships,
respectively, when the normal political power of propertied groups was
somewhat attenuated. Consequently, these statutes occasionally disad-
vantage the condemnee in ways which are inconsistent with the spirit, if
not the letter, of the constitutional provisions protecting private property.
A. The Public Purpose Requirement
The expropriatory process in both countries begins with a governmental
decree declaring that the property is being condemned for a public purpose
(utilidad patblica). Argentina requires specific legislation designating a
particular use as a'public purpose." Brazil, on the other hand, has statuto-
rily designated a long list of generic public purposes.2 Although in neither
country is the concept of public purpose precise,2 once the Executive has
designated a particular piece of property for condemnation, it is seldom
possible to prevent the taking in the courts.23 However, the condemnation
federal government's monopoly on expropriation legislation. 5 PoNms DE Ma.ANDA, supra note
9, at 384-85.
24. Law No. 13.264 of Sept. 17, 1948, Concerning Expropriation (Argen.) [hereinafter cited
as Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948]; Decree-Law No. 3.365 of June 21, 1941, Concerning
Expropriation (Braz.) [hereinafter cited as Braz. Expropriation Law of 19411.
25. Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 2.
26. Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941, art. 5.
27. In Argentina, "public purpose" is defined as "including every case aimed at satisfying
a requirement determined by social betterment." Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 1.
Brazil, as in many countries, distinguishes, somewhat artificially, between two classes of
takings: "public purpose" and "social interest." Public purpose takings encompass typical
public works, such as roads, schools, or hospitals. Social interest takings involve property
which may later be redistributed to private parties, such as agrarian reform or urban renewal.
See Seabra Fagundes, Brazil, in EXPROPRIATION 0  THE AMiEicAs 49, 61 (A. Lowenfeld ed.
1971).
28. The Argentine courts either regard the public purpose issue as non-justiciable or re-
viewable only for extreme arbitrariness. Provincia de Jujuy v. Ledesma Sugar Estates &
Refining Co., 209 Fallos 35 (1947) (nonjusticiable); Gobierno de la Nacidn v. Ingenio y Refi-
neria San Martin del Tabacal, S.A., 209 Fallos 390 (1947) (reviewable only for extreme
arbitrariness). But see Nacidn Argentina v. Jorge J. Ferrario, 251 Fallos 246 (1961) (taking
overturned where former president Per6n had arbitrarily ordered condemnation of a car for a
friend's use). See generally 4 S.V. LNAREs QUINTANA, TRATADO DE LA CIENcIA DEL DRzCu:o
CONSTrrucioNAL 142-53 (1956); Luqui, La Revisidn Judicial de la causa de Utilidad Pablica
en al Expropiaciln, 128 La Lay 1022, 1025 (1967).
The Brazilian judiciary has been precluded by statute from making an independent deter-
mination in the condemnation proceeding as to whether the use to which the property will
be put does in fact benefit the public. Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941, art. 9. However, the
Brazilian courts will review the issue of whether the taking has been for a public purpose in
an ordinary action brought to set aside the taking. R.E. No. 14.454, 289 R. Trib. 869 (S.T.F.
1958); Silva v. Prefeitura do Salvador, RE. 13.367, 141 R. For. 203 (S.T.F. 1949) (taking for
19751
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will lapse if there is neither a settlement nor institution of a condemnation
suit within a specified period of time from the publication of the decree.2 ,
B. Retrocession
In addition, if the property is not used or ceases to be used for a public
purpose, the condemnee has a chance to recover his former asset by invok-
ing his right of repurchase (retrocessi6n). Though the question has been
hotly contested, it would now appear settled that the right of retrocession
is recognized in both Argentine" and Brazilian law.3 '
C. The Expropriating Agency
Exercise of the power of eminent domain is restricted to the federal
government, states or provinces, and municipalities. However, public
utilities through contract or concession, condemnation power is often ex-
tended by statute to government instrumentalities, or to public utilities
through contract or concession.32 But designation of specific parcels for
condemnation requires an executive decree.
33
use of a private club set aside as an abuse of power); Luiz Hermany Filho & Cia. v. Prefeltura
do Distrito Federal, 26 R.D.A. 223 (7th Cam. Civ. T.J.D.F. 1951) (taking for use by private
athletic club set aside as an abuse of power).
29. Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 47 sets this period at 2, 5, or 10 years, depending
on the specificity of the expropriation designation. Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941, art. 14,
provides a period of 5 years for "public purpose" takings; "social interest" takings lapse after
only 2 years. Law No. 4.132 of Sept. 10, 1962, Concerning Expropriation for Social Interest,
art. 3 (Braz.).
30. The Argentine Supreme Court has recently upheld retrocession as a constitutional
right. Ortega, Juan de Dios v. Direcci6n Gral. de Fabricaciones Militares, 271 Fallos 42,
[1968-V] J.A. 240 (1968).
31. Brazilian courts have reached an analogous result to that in Argentina by applying
Article 1150 of the Civil Code, which provides:
The Federal Government, State, or Municipality shall offer the former owner
the expropriated property at the price paid whenever the property is not being
used for the purpose for which it was expropriated.
The Brazilian courts have restricted application of this principle to cases in which the
condemning agency fails to use the property at all or unlawfully transfers it to a third party.
Esp6lio de Maria Emilia Cardoso de Magalhdes Mexia Santos v. Pref. Mun. de Santos, 59
R.T.J. 631 (S.T.F. en banc 1971); Maria Carlota de Azevedo Penteado e outros v. Fazenda
do Estado, 57 R.T.J. 46 (2d Term S.T.F. 1970); Seabra Fagundes, supra note 27, at 73. The
courts and commentators are divided as to whether the former property owner's remedy
should be recovery of his property or merely damages. E. Chamoun, Da Retrocessfo nas
Desapropriq6es 47-65 (1959); 5 J. Cretella Jdnior, Tratado de Direito Administrativo 169-72
(1968); R. BARCELLOS DE MAGALHAMs, supra note 19, at 276-305.
32. Gordillo, supra note 12, at 27-29. Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941, arts. 2 & 3.
33. To prevent embarrassment to the federal government, Brazil recently enacted a decree-




In Argentina there is little possibility of a negotiated settlement without
special legislation. To prevent fraudulently large offers, the expropriating
agency is prohibited from offering the property owner more than 130 per-
cent of tax appraisal value.3' Since this figure rarely reflects current market
value, 5 the condemnee will usually reject the offer. In Brazil, on the other
hand, there is no such constraint on the expropriating agency. Thus, some
(though not a great many) offers are reasonable and result in settlements.
E. Appraisal Procedures
Judges in both countries rely heavily on the opinions of experts in deter-
mining the value of expropriated property. For real property appraisal in
Argentina, the courts have been required to utilize the services of an ad-
ministrative body- the Appraisal Tribunal (Tribunal De Tasaciones). For
eminent domain valuation, the Tribunal is comprised of ten permanent
members and two ad hoc representatives of the parties.!' While the valua-
tion of the Appraisal Tribunal is not conclusive, the Argentine courts have
regarded unanimous (or nearly unanimous) decisions of that body as
decisive.7 Moreover, if either party's representative votes in favor of the
in institutions or firms whose functioning depends upon authorization and inspection by the
federal government, unless the President issues a decree authorizing such expropriation.
Decree-Law No. 856 of Sept. 11, 1969. Brizola, ex-Governor of the State of Rio Grande do
Sul, had considerably embarassed ex-President Goulart by expropriating the property of the
local subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph Co. in 1962 just as Goulart was
preparing to leave for the United States to arrange external financing to shore up Brazil's
tottering economy. See T. SKM0o1, PoLmcs iN BRAZIL, 1930-1964, at 244 (1967).
34. Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 13.
35. Two recent cases involving a rent ceiling based on tax appraisal values demonstrate
how little of a relationship the tax values bear to present values. In one case the undisputed
real value of the property was placed at twelve times the tax value; in the other at about nine
times the tax value. Garcia y Martin, Narclsco v. Junta Nac. de Granos., 138 La Ley 690 (C.
Fed. Cap. Sala Civ. y Com. 1969); Vaneskeheian, Arsen v. Gobierno Nacional, 138 La Ley
698 (C. Fed. Cap. Sala Civ. y Com. 1969).
36. The ten permanent members consist of three representatives of associations of archi-
tects, engineers, and contractors; two taxpayer representatives (designated by the Executive);
one employee each from the Army Engineers, the National Mortgage Bank, the General
Administration of Sanitary Works, and the Municipality of Buenos Aires; and the presiding
officer, the Director of Real Property Administration or his designate. Decree 15.715/59;
Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 14. The operations of the Appraisal Tribunal are
discussed in 2 J. CANAsi, TRATADo TE RICO PRACTICO DE LA ExPROPRIACI&N POIRLICA 605-11
(1967). See also Gordillo, supra note 12, at 35.
37. The Argentine Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the valuation of the Appraisal
Tribunal, if unanimous except for the representative of the condemnee, is of "decisive import-
ance." Naci6n Argentina v. Transradio Cid. Argen. de Telecomunicaciones, A.A., 208 Fallcs
88, 11 J.A. 428, 429 (1971).
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Tribunal's appraisal, that party is estopped from subsequently challenging
the appraisal .3 For personal property, Argentina uses panels of ad hoc
appraisers,39 a procedure used by Brazil to appraise both real and personal
property. In Brazil, there are typically three expert appraisers, one desig-
nated by the trial judge and the other two by the parties. 0 In theory, the
judge places a "just" value on the property; however, in practice, the judge
generally follows the report of the appraiser whom he has selected.
F. Valuation
The most difficult, and in many respects the most crucial, question on
which to focus in appraising eminent domain legislation is valuation. Be-
cause property can be valued in many different ways, depending on the
type of property and the purpose of the valuation, legislators tend to gloss
over the valuation issue with vague admonitions to the courts or expert
appraisers. The drafters of the Argentine and Brazilian expropriation laws
were not exceptional in this respect.
The Argentine Expropriation Law simply states that compensation shall
only include the "objective value" of the property taken." The statute
provides virtually no valuation guidelines, indicating only that personal
circumstances, sentimental value, scenic view, historical value, lost prof-
its, and hypothetical gains are to be excluded from compensation.2
In practice, however, the Argentine courts customarily permit appraisers
to utilize one or more of the following valuation factors:
(1) Market value of comparable property
(2) Capitalization of net income
(3) Location
(4) State of repair




The weight ascribed to any particular factor and preference for certain
techniques over others vary from case to case."
38. Dir. Gral. de Ingenieros v. Musto, 214 Fallos 73, 56 La Ley 292 (1949).
39. Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 16.
40. Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941, art. 14.
41. Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 11.
42. Id.
43. Goldman & Paxman, Real Property Valuations in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, in 2
THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129, 146-63 (R. Lillich ed.
1973); Gordillo, supra note 12, at 30-32.
44. Goldman & Paxman, supra note 43, at 146-63.
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The Brazilian Expropriation Law directs the court to pay special atten-
tion to the following factors in setting a value upon expropriated property:
(1) Tax assessment value
(2) Acquisition cost
(3) Income derived from the property
(4) Location
(5) State of repair
(6) Valuation for insurance purposes
(7) Market value of comparable property during the past five
years
(8) Enhancement or depreciation of the expropriated party's
remaining prdperty.15
But, as in Argentina, the statute makes no effort to establish priorities
or weights among the above factors,"8 nor does it spell out how these factors
are to be determined. A reading of the technical norms presently being
applied by court-appointed appraisers in Sio Paulo suggests that factors
(1) and (6) are considered irrelevant; that factors (7), (8), and (3) are
crucial for appraising land; and that reproduction cost less depreciation is
the crucial factor for appraising improvements." In valuing income-
producing property, the most important factor would appear to be the
amount of income being generated."
G. Consequential Damages
As a general rule, the eminent domain laws of both Argentina and Brazil
permit recovery for damages which are the "direct and immediate" conse-
quences of condemnation. However, they diverge as to which items of
damage are encompassed by the term "direct and immediate." This diver-
gence stems from somewhat different doctrinal views as to the purpose of
compensation. Until very recently, Argentine doctrine and case law specifi-
cally rejected the view that the purpose of compensation is to enable the
condemnee to purchase a comparable asset. Rather the goal of
compensation was perceived as ensuring that the condemnee suffered no
patrimonial loss from the condemnation." Brazilian doctrine and case law,
45. Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941, art. 27.
46. Article 27 of the Braz. Expropriation Law of 1941 originally contained a paragraph
limiting the maximum amount of an expropriation award for property subject to a property
tax on a building to twenty times the rental value less the tax. This provision, which was
regularly eviscerated by the Brazilian courts, was repealed by Law 2.786 of May 21, 1956. See
Rosenn, Expropriation, Inflation, and Development 1972 Wis. L. Rxv. 845, 858-59.
47. Normas Gerais para Avaliaq~es em Desapropriaqfs, 449 R. Trib. 308 (1973).
48. Seabra Fagundes, supra note 27, at 63.
49. See Gordillo, supra note 12, at 29-30.
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on the other hand, has viewed the purpose of compensation as restoring
the condemnee to his prior position, i.e., permitting purchase of a compa-
rable asset."
Consequently, Brazilian law has treated the condemnee more liberally
than Argentine law in several respects. Brazil generally has permitted
recovery for lost profits during the period reasonably required to relocate
or acquire a comparable income-producing property.' It has also permit-
ted recovery for good will when a commercial establishment is taken."
Argentina, on the contrary, has consistently excluded such items from
compensation awards. Brazil has also permitted, under certain circum-
stances, recovery of the expenses of reinvesting the award, such as pay-
ment of title registration fee, deed preparation, and transfer tax," while
Argentina has not. Finally, Brazil routinely has permitted the condemnee
to cover his court costs, appraisal fees, and attorney's fee.5 Argentina has
permitted recovery of these expenses only when the compensation award
exceeded the condemnor's offer by at least 50 percent of the difference
between the offer and condemnee's demand.
58
50. See Seabra Fagundes, supra note 27, at 62-64. In Provincia de Santa Fe v. Nicchi, 268
Fallos 112, 114, [1967-IV] J.A. 115, 127 La Ley 164 (1967), the Argentine Supreme Court
viewed the purpose of compensation as enabling the condemnee to purchase a comparable
asset.
51. Id. at 63-64. However, there are numerous cases and doctrinal writings on both sides
of this issue. The cases and doctrine are collected in Ferraz, Desapropriaqao: Indicaqaes de
Doctrina e Jurisprudncia, 22 REvISTA DE DmIrro DA PRocuRADORA GERAL 344, 384-85 (1970).
52. Compensation for good will may be awarded in the condemnation suit if the property
owner himself has operated a business on the condemned premises. A.C. No. 66.646 of the
6th Civ. Cham. T.J.S.P., summarized in R. BAczLoS DE MAOALHAES, supra note 19, at 226-
27. A commercial tenant who has lost his business location because of expropriation may
recover for loss of good will in a separate damage action against the condemnor. R.E.
9.557,151 R. For. 159 (S.T.F. 1951). Candido dos Santos & Irmfo v. Estado da Guanabara,
A.C. 36.856, 11 R.J.E.G. 205 (5th Civ. Cham. T.J.E.G. 1964); Quaresma & Montinho v. Prof.
Mun. de Sdo Paulo, A.C. 53.391, 145 For. 316 (1st Civ. Chain. T.J.S.P. 1951). Cases and
doctrine on both sides of this issue are collected in Ferraz, supra note 51, at 390-91.
53. Lost profits: Musso, Eugenio S. v. Naci6n, 242 Fallos 254 [1958-IV] J.A. 471 (1958);
Administraci6n General de Obras Sanitarias de la Naci6n v. Torquinst y Bernal, 241 Failos
73, [1959-Ill] J.A. 509, 92 La Ley 77 (1958); Gobierno Nacional v. Dumas, [1947-Ill] J.A.
174, 47 La Ley 865 (Sup. Ct. 1947). However, there are several lower and provincial court
cases which have permitted recovery of lost profits. These cases are collected in 7 DIesTo
JURDICO (La Ley) 896 n.152 (1968).
Good will: Musso, Eugenio S. v. Naci6n, 242 Fallos 254, [1958-IV] J.A. 471, 472 (1958);
Adm. Gral. de Obras Sanitarias de la Naci6n v. Garca Espina, Julio, 2 J.A. 427 (C. Fed.
Cap. Sala Civ. y Com. 1969); Fernandez, Jos6 v. Gobierno Nacional, 100 La Ley 634 (C.
Fed. Cap. Sala Civ. y Com. 1960); Schinocca, Luis v. Dir. Nac. de Vialidad, 10 J.A. 226 (C.
Fed. Cap. 1st Sala Civ. y Com. 1970).
54. See R. BARCELLOS DE MAGALHiE5, supra note 19, at 230-31. Cases and doctrine on both
sides of this issue are collected in Ferraz, supra note 51, at 395.
55. H. LoPEs MEMRELLES, DixRrro ADMInmASTIvO BRASILMRO 506 (2d ed. 1966).
56. Argen. Expropriation Law of 1948, art. 28. The unconstitutionality of this article has
been frequently, but unsuccessfully, urged. Gordillo, supra note 12, at 32.
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H. Form of Payment
In one respect, Argentina has treated the condemnee more liberally than
Brazil: Argentina requires payment in cash before the court will transfer
title.Y Prior to the 1946 Constitution, Brazil permitted compensation in
the form of bonds. "  However, the difference in treatment was not invidi-
ous, for the Brazilian courts insisted that when compensation was paid in
bonds, the relevant value of the bonds was market value, not face value."
Since 1969, Brazilian law has again recognized compensation in the form
of bonds. As part of the lengthy process of gearing-up for agrarian reform,
the military government amended the 1967 Constitution by fiat to permit
expropriation of rural property upon payment in special bonds. The bonds
have an exact adjustment for inflation, are redeemable in a maximum
period of 20 years, and are acceptable in payment of up to 50 percent of
the real property tax."o However, thus far, Brazil has seen a great deal of
gearing-up, but little agrarian reform.
Ill. EXPROPRIATION IN PRACTICE
The foregoing description of the constitutional and statutory provisions
regulating expropriation provides only a partial answer to the question: to
what extent do Argentine and Brazilian law prevent private property from
being taken without just compensation? Even more important are the
following considerations. To what extent have three decades of continuous,
57. Gordillo, supra note 12, at 34-35.
58. Article 32 of the Brazilian Expropriation Law of 1941 permitted the legislature to
authorize, in special cases, payment in negotiable bonds in accordance with the value at
which they are traded on the day prior to the effectuation of payment. Decree.Law 3.532 of
Aug. 21, 1941, art. 6, provided that compensation for property condemned pursuant to gener-
alized urban plans should be paid half in cash and half in bonds, unless there was an
allegation of urgency or the condemnee insisted on litigating, in which case the compensation
was to be paid entirely in bonds. These provisions were later amended by Decree.Law 8.940
of Jan. 26, 1946, to permit compensation to be paid half in bonds and half in cash, or entirely
in cash, at the option of the expropriating agency. In 1956 the law was again amended to
eliminate the possiblity of payment in bonds and to require payment in cash. Law 2.786 of
May 21, 1956 (Braz.).
59. E.g., Estado de Minas Gerais v. Pedro Miguel, Embargos 5.815, 142 R. For. 297 (1st
Civ. Chain. M.G. 1949). Several commentators argued that bonds did not satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement that compensation be "prior." E.g., S. PEa.MA, 0 PODMa oD DsAPRoPRIAR
158 (1948); Seabra Fagundes, A Desapropriaqao no Direito Constitucional Brasileiro, 120 R.
For. 5 (1948); Barreto Filho, 0 Adjustamento da Lei de Desapropriaqes a Constituiqdo de
18 de Setembro de 1946, 264 R. Trib. 26 (1957). But there appear to be no reported cases
contesting the constitutionality of this form of compensation.
60. Institutional Act No. 9 of Apr. 25, 1969, amending Article 157(1) of the 1967 Constitu-
tion. This provision was later incorporated into a Constitutional amendment where the use
of bonds is limited to the expropriation of latifundios (large estates). CoNs'rrMqAo art. 161
(1967, as amended 1969) (Braz.).
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severe inflation skewed the operation of the eminent domain process? To
what extent will the courts protect private property from "creeping
expropriation," i.e., indirect taking without compensation through the use
of taxing, regulatory, or similar measures? To what extent has property,
particularly that held by foreigners, been expropriated by the use of special
or exceptional laws or decrees?
A. The Grand Larceny of Inflation
Argentina and Brazil have long been at or near the top of the list of
countries with the most severe rates of inflation." Between 1950 and 1960,
the official cost of living index for Buenos Aires increased more than
eleven-fold, rising more than 100 percent in 1959 alone. Between 1960 and
1973, consumer prices in Argentina rose by an annual average of 28.3
percent." Between 1950 and 1960, Brazilian inflation ran behind that of
Argentina, as Rio de Janeiro's cost of living index increased by a multiple
of six-and-one-half. However, from 1960 to 1973 Brazil more than caught
up; the official consumer price index for Rio increased by an annual aver-
age of 38.5 percent. 3 Such high rates of sustained inflation have decimated
the currencies of both countries, as is readily apparent by comparison of
exchange rates vis-A-vis the U.S. dollar, which has itself depreciated sub-
stantially during this period. In 1950, the rate of exchange was roughly 3.3
pesos and 18.7 cruzeiros to the dollar; today it is more than 1000 pesos and
7400 cruzeiros to the dollar.
The author has elsewhere explored in considerable detail the ways in
which inflation undermined compensation requirements in Argentina and
Brazil.65 To summarize, inflation prevents condemnees from receiving the
approximate equivalent of the assets taken from them in three ways. First,
61. See Adekunle, Rates of Inflation in Industrial, Other Developed, and Less Developed
Countries, 1949-1965, 15 IMF STAF PAPERS 531, 532 (1968).
62. Calculated from the price index published by Argentina's Instituto Nacional do
Estadistica y Censos.
63. Calculated from the price index prepared by the Fundaggo Gmljlio Vargas and pub.
lished in CONJUNTURA EcoN6MICA. There is reason to believe that the rate reported in recent
years understates the actual inflation rate. See Penteado, Indices do custo de vida e rros dos
interpretaqes, Estado do Sdo Paulo, Jan. 31, 1973, at 32, col. 3. See also Estado de Sfio Paulo,
Jan. 17, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
64. In 1967 Brazil adopted the new cruzeiro as its basic monetary unit. One new cruzeiro
was equivalent to 1000 old cruzeiros. Decree-Law No. 1 of Nov. 13, 1965, as modified by
Decree-Law No. 7 of May 13, 1966. In 1970 the adjective "new" was dropped. Argentina
enacted a similar reform in 1969, making one new peso the equivalent of 100 old pesos. Law
18.188 of Apr. 15, 1969. To avoid confusion all cruzeiro and peso references in the text are
stated in terms of the old currency. One should bear in mind that exchange rates in both
countries were artifically established for much of this period.
65. See generally Rosenn, supra note 46.
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"quick take" statutes, which permit the condemnor to obtain possession
upon deposit of a sum linked to tax appraisal values, have been used
extensively." Tax appraisal values seldom correspond to fair market value
even in the year originally made; rapid inflation sharply accentuates the
disparity. Consequently, a substantial portion of the compensation which
should be due is not paid prior to the taking." Second, there has invariably
been a lag between the time of valuation and the time of judgment. During
this lag, which commonly stretched to several years, the real value of the
peso or cruzeiro award depreciated substantially." Third, judgments in
eminent domain cases often remained unpaid for shockingly long periods.
Particularly in Brazil, there are numerous cases in which awards have
remained unpaid for more than a decade." Though the courts awarded
interest on the unpaid judgments, the legal interest rate was sharply nega-
tive.
70
For more than twenty years, the highest courts of Argentina and Brazil
stubbornly refused to prevent the partial confiscations resulting from infla-
tionary distortions of the condemnation process." Following a military
coup d'etat in 1967 that replaced the entire membership of the Supreme
Court, the reconstituted Argentine high court finally permitted recovery
of compensation for monetary depreciation of eminent domain awards.n
Similarly, not until 1965, when a military regime committed to raising
resources for development through private savings and investment enacted
a statute providing for monetary correction of eminent domain awards
which had been unpaid for more than a year,73 did the Brazilian high court
change its orientation. Though neither court assures complete protection
of eminent domain awards from inflationary erosion, the change in their
orientations has very substantially neutralized the effects of inflation.
B. The Petit Larceny of the Police and Tax Powers
Ascertaining when property has been "taken" for the purpose of trigger-
ing the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation is an extraordinarily
difficult task. A variety of tax and regulatory measures operate either to
deprive property owners of some, but not all, of their property rights, or to
deprive them of virtually all of their property rights under circumstances
66. Indeed in Brazil virtually every expropriation is a "quick take." Id.
67. Id. at 854-55.
68. Id. at 855-56.
69. Id. at 860-61.
70. Id. at 856-57, 860-61.
71. Id. at 861-62.
72. Provincia de Santa Fe v. Nicchi, 268 Fallos 112, [19'7-IV] J.A. 115 (1967).
73. Law No. 4.686 of June 21, 1965 (Braz.).
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in which the government claims that it has not taken private property.
United States courts and commentators have experienced great difficulty
in trying to draw the line between compensable takings and non-
compensable regulation." Given the U.S. origins of much of Argentine and
Brazilian constitutional law, it should not be surprising that Argentine and
Brazilian responses have displayed similar inconsistencies.
1. Taxation
Every tax is to some extent a taking of property by the state. But the
exercise of the power to tax does not normally give rise to a claim that
property has been unconstitutionally taken unless the tax rate is excessive,
or the tax itself is discriminatory. Whether a tax constitutes an unconstitu-
tional confiscation or discrimination is primarily a question of degree: does
the tax take too much, or is it unreasonable under the circumstances? Also
relevant is whether the activity taxed is one that the government might
prohibit entirely without compensation through the exercise of its police
powers.' 5
The Argentine courts have been zealous in their efforts to prevent confis-
catory or discriminatory taxation. As a general rule, the Argentine courts
will invalidate any tax which absorbs a substantial part of capital or a
disproportionate amount of income, or which is arbitrarily directed at one
person or a group of persons.76 On several occasions the Argentine Supreme
Court has declared that taxes which take more than 33 percent of the
income from the taxpayer's capital are confiscatory.7 It has also invalida-
74. See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165
(1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALz L.J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by
Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1971).
75. Since socially undesirable activities such as gambling or narcotics can be prohibited
entirely without compensation through the exercise of the police power, a confiscatory tax
on such activities would not be an unconstitutional taking. The state would simply be utiliz-
ing its taxing power to perform a police power function. Cf. Parsons Claim in NIELSEN,
AMERICAN & BRITISH CLAIMs ARBITRATION 587 (1925).
76. Soficomar (S.R.L.) v. Gobierno Nacional, 268 Fallos 56, [1968-11] J.A. 194, 195 (1967);
4 S. V. LINAREs QUINTANA, supra note 28, at 446-54.
77. Synge v. Gobierno Nacional, 235 Fallos 883 (1956); Devoto y Gonzdlez v. Prov. do
C6rdoba, 214 Fallos 88, [1948-11 J.A. 532 (1948); Santaf~sima de Inmeubles y Construcciones
v. Prov. de C6rdoba, 211 Fallos 1781 (1948); Bemvinda de Acevedo y Castro de Da Cdmara
Lomelino v. Prov. de Buenos Aires, 32 La Ley 112 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
However, the Supreme Court has declined the invitation to hold that a province's imposi.
tion of a capital gains tax on the proceeds of an expropriation award ipso facto constitutes a
violation of the constitutional guarantee of private property. D~go, FM1ix Antonio, 242 Fallos
73, [1959-11] J.A. 402 (1959).
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ted taxes discriminating against aliens.7 8 Though it has sustained a higher
tax rate on premiums paid to foreign insurers than on those paid to na-
tional insurers, the Court intimated that the result would have been differ-
ent had the foreign insurance company been permanently situated in Ar-
gentina and investing its premiums within the country."
The Brazilian courts are less likely to intercede in tax matters than their
Argentine counterparts. 0 Despite income tax rates that, on occasion,
reached 118 percent of a taxpayer's income," or exchange rate "confisca-
tion" on the exportation of coffee that absorbed more than half the price
of the product,"2 research has disclosed no reported Brazilian cases invali-
dating such taxation. 3
2. Economic Regulation
As in most nations, whether developed or developing, the governments
of Argentina and Brazil in the twentieth century have felt the necessity to
intervene in what had previously been regarded as strictly private eco-
nomic activity. The tremendous economic dislocations wrought by the
great depression, two world wars, chronic inflation, rapid urbanization,
and industrialization; the political pressures generated by rising national-
ism; and the development of a widespread expectation that governments
can stimulate speedy economic growth have dramatically altered nine-
78. Gobierno de Italia, en Lora, Fdlix (suc.) v. Consejo Nac. de Educacidn, 190 Fallos 159,
75 J.A. 48 (1941). In this case the Court invalidated a 100 percent tax on legacies to heirs
domiciled abroad on three theories: (1) the tax was confiscatory, (2) the tax discriminated
against aliens, and (3) the tax violated art. 67(16) of the Constitution. The third theory was
a curious makeweight, for art. 67(16) provides:
Congress shall have power:.. . To provide whatever is conducive to the prosper-
ity of the country, .. . promoting industry, immigration, ... the importation
of foreign capital, and the exploration of the interior rivers, by protective laws and
by temporary concessions of privileges and the offering of awards.
79. Guardian Assurance Co. v. Gobierno de la Nacidn, 150 Fallos 104 (1927).
80. See, e.g., Marques & Viegas v. Prefeitura Municipal de Santos, R.E. No. 18.331, 145
R. For.164 (S.T.F. 1951) (upholding a tax increase of 1,040.4% on beach tents at Santos);
Micelli v. Prefeitura Municipal de Araraquara, 5 Rev. Dir. Procur. Geral 135 (Dec. of Judge
Hely Lopes Meirelles) aff'd, A.C. No. 69.883 (2d Civ. Chain. of the Trib. of Just. of Sio Paulo
1954). See generally A. BALEmo, LitITAOES CoNsmrtmONAis .o PODEs Dc ThiurAR 237.41
(2d ed. 1960).
81. See Rosen, Adaptations of the Brazilian Income Tax to Inflation, 21 STA%, L. Rxv. 58,
72-73 (1968).
82. See A. BALE Ro, DmErro TamuruAmo BRsmstmo 68-69 (1970). Cf. Banco do Basil, S.A.
v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235 (1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964) (exchange regulation required forced sale of coffee proceeds at 90
cruzeiros to the dollar instead of the free market rate of 220 cruzeiros).
83. There were, however, several early cases invalidating the coffee quota system because
of its violation of the right of private property. The cases are discussed in A. VA.icio Fn.uo,
A INTRvENgAO DO EsTADO No Dormfo ECONdiico 87-89 (1968).
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teenth century notions about the proper role of the state in the economy.
In the past fifty years both Argentina and Brazil have progressively
scrapped classical laissez-faire doctrines in favor of widespread govern-
mental intervention in and control of the economy."
Much of this intervention has substantially restricted exercise of private
property rights. Thus, certain industries have been monopolized by the
state." Rent controls have restricted landlords' power to evict tenants and
increase rents." Price and wage controls have restricted contractual
rights." Crop quotas have restricted farmers' rights to plant more than
specified acreage." And zoning, set-back limitations, building codes, and
subdivision regulations have directly restricted land use."
Juridical responses to such encroachments on property rights in Argen-
tina and Brazil have been predictably mixed. Leading constitutional schol-
ars have considered state monopolization akin to expropriation, requiring
just compensation to concerns forced out of business."0 However, the issue
84. The Brazilian experience is meticulously chronicled in A. VENANCIO FmHo, note 83
supra. For a brief resume and update, see Baer, Kerstenetsky, and Villela, The Changing Role
of the State in the Brazilian Economy, 1 WoRLD DEVELOPMENT 23 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Baer]. An overview of the Argentine experience appears in 4 S.V. LINARES QUINTANA, note
28 supra; L. GONZALEZ AGUAYO, LA NACIONALIZAC16N EN AmmRICA LATINA 130-37 (1965).
85. The 1949 Peronist Constitution gave the Argentine federal government monopolies over
all mines; petroleum, coal, and gas deposits; and natural sources of energy. CONSTruciON art.
40 (1949) (Argen.); 4 S.V. LINARES QUINTANA, supra note 28, at 274. From 1955 to 1972 the
Argentine government gradually divested itself of some of the monopolies which it acquired
during the first Per6n-era. However, it retained the railroads, as well as the telephone, tele.
graph, electric, and gas systems. See F. MUNSON, AREA HANDBOOK FOR ARGENTINA 253, 255
(1969). Since Per6n's recent return to power, this trend has been reversed. New legislation
has been enacted nationalizing bank deposits and foreign trade. See Bayitch, Inter-American
Legal Developments, 6 LAW. OF THE AMERICAS 93, 95-96 (1974).
The federal government in Brazil presently enjoys statutorily created monopolies on crude
oil production (Decree-Law 3.236 of May 7, 1941); rubber (Laws 86 of Sept. 8, 1947 and 1.184
of Aug. 30, 1950); and telecommunications (Law 4.117 of Aug. 27, 1962). In addition, the
government has quasi-monopolies in several areas, principally steel, electric power, and rail.
ways. See Gudin, The Chief Characteristics of the Postwar Economic Development of Brazil,
in THE ECONOMY OF BRAZIL 3, 20-22 (H. Ellis ed. 1969).
86. See generally Rosenn, Controlled Rents and Uncontrolled Inflation: the Brazilian
Dilemma, 17 AM. J. COMp. L. 239 (1969); Oria, Algunos aspectos sociales de la legislaci6n de
alquileres, [1971] J.A. DocTRRiNA 491 (1971).
87. For a concise historical analysis of price controls in Brazil, see A. VENANCIO FILHO, supra
note 83, at 225-39. See also Baer, supra note 84, at 31. A capsulized history of price controls
in Argentina appears in M. CIcHERO & A. CozzI, MANUAL DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO Y
LEGISLACi6N FISCAL 120-22 (1963). For historical analyses of governmental regulation of wages,
see R. ALEXANDER, LABOR RELATIONS IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE (1962).
88. See A. VENANCIO FmHo, supra note 83, at 80-113.
89. 4 S. V. LINARES QUINTANA, supra note 28, at 267; 5 PONTES DE MIRANDA, supra note 9,
at 376-81.
90. See H. MEmEnLES, DifErro ADMINISTRATVO BRAsiLEIRo 127-30, 141-48 (2d ed. 1966); 8
R. SALVAT, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO 595-639 (3d ed. 1946).
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does not appear to have been litigated, for state monopolies, in areas in
which private firms have operated, have generally been created by negoti-
ated purchase, eminent domain, or, as in the case of Brazilian oil explora-
tion, have preceded private entry.9
Rent controls, maintained continuously since the early 1940's, have seri-
ously disadvantaged Argentine and Brazilian landlords. By automatically
extending leases at pre-existing rates, or with only minimal increases in
rent, during long period of severe inflation, rent control statutes drastically
reduced real rental income.92 The Argentine courts have provided some
protection to the landlord. As early as 1922, the Argentine Supreme Court
made it clear that only a housing emergency would justify a rent control
statute's invasion of property rights." Finding three years later that any
emergency had passed, the Court declared rent control an unconstitutional
invasion of private property.9 But Argentina's housing crisis has become
chronic, and on several more recent occasions, the Supreme Court has
sustained rent control legislation.95 Nevertheless, the Federal Court of
Appeals of Buenos Aires recently held that a provision limiting rentals,
when the state is a tenant, to 30 percent of an unrealistically low tax
appraisal value unconstitutionally interferes with private property rights.13
Curiously, no Brazilian court has invalidated a rent control statute be-
cause it operated as a taking of private property without compensation."
91. E.g., Brazilian Decree No. 53.701 of March 13, 1964, expropriating the shares of all
private companies engaged in the refining of petroleum, and providing for compensation book
value. See generally L. GONZAisz AGUAyO, supra note 84, at 130-37. 164-66; W. Ness, Local
Equity Participation in the Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations: The Case of Brazil,
14-16, Nov. 1973 (Working Paper in N.Y.U. Grad. School of Bus. Ad., No. 73-72).
One exception would appear to be Argentina's creation of a trade institute (Instituto Argen-
tino de Promoci6n del Intercambio), which monopolized foreign trade in cereals, meat, and
leather goods. Apparently, no compensation was paid to the exporters put out of business by
this trade monopoly. Cf. L. GoNzAtm AGUAYO, supra note 84, at 132.
92. An index of real controlled housing rents for Argentina with a base period 1935-39 equal
to 100 shows a rapid and steady decline. By 1948 the index had fallen to 48, and by 1965 the
index had been reduced to 3. C. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS oN THE EcoNouc HLSTORY OF Tm
ARGENTINE REPUBUC 537 (1970).
An apartment rented in 1945 in Brazil for about $100 (at the then prevailing exchange rate)
would not have been permitted a rental increase until 1963, when the exchange value of the
rental would have been reduced to about $3.07. Commercial rentals were treated a bit more
generously. A store rented for $100 in 1945 would have been renting for the equivalent of
$15.35 in 1963. Rosenn, supra note 86, at 265.
93. Ercolano v. Lanteri, 136 Fallos 161, 8 J.A. 263 (1922).
94. Mango v. Traba, 144 Fallos 219, 17 J.A. 11 (1925).
95. Galarza, Isabelino v. Dopaci6, Jos6, 42 La Ley 872, [1946-InU1 J.A. 401 (1946); Nadur,
Amar v. Borelli, Francisco, [1959-Il] J.A. 475 (1959). See generally Bidart Campos, La
Actual Legislaci6n de Emergencia en Mfateria de Locaciones, [1959.1 J.A. 459 (1959).
96. GARCiLA y Marthn, Narcisco v.Junta Nac. de Granos, 138 La Ley 690 (C. Fed. Cap. Sala
Civ. y Com. 1969); Vaneskeheian, Arsen v. Gobierno Nacional, 138 La Ley 698 (C. Fed. Cap.
Sala Civ. y Com. 1969).
97. Rosenn, supra note 86, at 250.
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As might be expected in chronically inflationary economies, price con-
trols have become a more or less permanent part of the Argentine and
Brazilian legal landscape. The constitutionality of price controls has been
consistently sustained by the courts of both countries," even when imple-
mentation has required firms to operate at a loss.99 However, neither coun-
try has deliberately employed price controls, coupled with massive manda-
tory wage increases, to take over legitimate businesses without compensa-
tion, a technique utilized extensively in Chile during the Allende regime.",
The constitutionality of reasonable land-use regulations has also been
sustained by the courts.'"' Only on rare occasions, such as when the state
has prohibited a property owner from cutting the timber on his land, have
the courts required payment of compensation. 02
In short, the law governing police power regulation of private property
in Argentina and Brazil fairly approximates that of the United States.
Indeed, the cases and commentators have frequently cited U.S. Supreme
Court decisions as precedents in this area of constitutional law. The courts
have accorded a wide degree of latitude to the Legislature in dealing with
socio-economic problems, and have tended to intervene to protect property
rights only when the regulation has been unreasonable, discriminatory, or
unfairly restrictive.
98. Argentina: Kloosterboer, Guillermo v. Gobierno Nacional, [1946-HI] J.A. 450 (Sup.
Ct. 1946); Martini e Hijos (Soc. de Resp. Ltda.), 200 Fallos 450, [1945-I] J.A. 633 (1944).
The Brazilian cases are discussed in A. VENANCIO Fi.Ho, supra note 84, at 230-37.
99. Argentina: Martini e Hijos (Soc. de Resp. Ltda.), 200 Fallos 450, [1945-111] J.A. 633
(1944). Brazil: Sociedade de Laticinios DomnioLtda. v. Uniio Federal R.E. 52.010,33 R.T.J.
720 (S.T.F. en banc 1965). In practice price controls have not seriously threatened the profita-
bility of most businesses. The Brazilian pattern used to be to force increases by witholding
products from the market, or to create a thriving black market. See R. RICHERS, IMPACTO DA
AqA0o DO Gov mNo S6BRE AS EMPRAsAsBRAsILERAS 158-59 (1963). Now a firm which raises its
prices without adequate cost justification only risks having its credit curtailed. See Baer,
supra note 84, at 31.
100. See J. Stasma, Some Economic Aspects of Non-Violent Revolution in Chile and Peru,
with Emphasis on the Mining and Manufacturing Sectors 19-20 (unpublished paper pre-
sented at the Annual Meeting of the Latin American Studies Ass'n, Austin, Texas, Dec.
1961). See also Petras, Political and Social Change in Chile, in LATIN AMERICA: FROM DEPEND-
ENcE TO REVOLUTION 9, 24-27 (J. Petras ed. 1973).
101. Argentina: E.g., Publicidad Eureka (S.A.) v. Municip. de Vincente L6pez, 48 J.A. 607
(Sup. Ct. B.A. 1934). See 4 R. BELSA, DERECHO ADMINIsTRATIVO 319-64 (5th ed. 1955). See
also P. ALTAMIA, POLIC.A Y PODER DE POLICLA 240-42 (1963).
Brazil: E.g., Raimundo Magro v. Departamento de Estradas de Rodagem, R.E. 70.795, 59
R.T.J. 91 (S.T.F. 2d Term 1971) (prohibition of constuction on 15 meter strip along a road-
way); Mun. de Sdo Paulo v. Olga Mercado Kury, No. 88.128, 289 R. Trib. 456 (T.J.S.P. en
banc 1958) (zoning prohibiting a gasoline station). See generally H. MEIRELLES, DIRMrrO DE
CONSTRUm 99-136 (2d ed. 1965).
102. Brazil: Agro Florestal Giorgi Ltda. v. Fazenda do Estado, No. 157.299, 431 R. Trib.
141 (5th Cam. Trib. de Alqada Civ. S.P. 1971).
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C. Treating the Foreign Investor "Specially"
Argentine and Brazilian law discriminate against foreign investors in
several respects, though in comparison with some of the other Latin Ameri-
can countries, such discrimination has been rather mild. The principal
areas of discrimination are: (1) prohibition of foreign investment from
certain sensitive spheres, (2) restrictions on profit remittance, (3) restric-
tions on capital repatriation, and (4) restrictions on borrowing.
1. Prohibition of Foreign Investment
During the 1960's, prohibitions on foreign investment in Argentina were
virtually eliminated. 1 But, since 1970, governmental authorization has
become necessary for the entry of new investment into the country,N and
foreign investment has been subjected to steadily inceasing restraints.'1
The recent return of the Peronists to power has resulted in a new foreign
investment statute prohibiting all new foreign investment in: (1) industries
with limited or restricted export possibilities; (2) industries connected with
national security; (3) public utilities; (4) insurance; (5) commercial bank-
ing, with the exception of branches of foreign banks where reciprocity
exists; (6) financing institutions; and (7) the communications media.1/3
With certain narrowly defined exceptions, the law also bars foreign acquisi-
tions of existing Argentine companies, as well as all new foreign investment
in marketing services, agriculture, ranching, forestry, and fishing.' The
requirement of prior approval of all new foreign investment by the Argen-
tine Government has been retained.' Previous foreign investment in in-
103. See ERNST & ERNST, ARGENMA: CHAncrEmtsmcs op Busihzs Km=rns 9 (1971). For
a summary of previous legislation, see Petrelli, Capitales Extranieros en la Argentina, 13
EsruDios SOBME LA EcoNowk ARGENTNA 78, 82 (1972).
104. Law 18.587 of Feb. 12, 1970 (Argen.); Decree No. 182/70 of Jan. 19, 1970 (Argen.). The
latter has been administered to screen out foreign capital which does not appear to promote
development. See Comment, Argentine Foreign Investment Incentives: Quixotic Nationalism
Challenges the Windfall, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 240, 247 (1972).
105. See Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Laws, 6
INT'L LAw. 64, 68 (1972).
106. Law No. 20.577 of Nov. 7, 1973, art. 6 (Argen.). An English translation of this law
appears in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALs 1489 (1973).
107. Id.
108. Id. at art. 4. Foreign investments will not be approved if they are subject to export
limitations, refuse to abide by a Calvo clause, or allow foreign nations or international organi-
zations to be subrogated to their claims. Id. at art. 6 (a) & (b). This last restriction appears
to deny U.S. investors the option of insuring their investments with the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and to derogate the bilateral investment guarantee agreement in
operation between the United States and Argentina since 1959. See note 237 infra. Recently
issued regulations suggest that the government will automatically renew investment con-
tracts, which have a five year term, at least once. However, the government can insist on a
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dustries connected with national security and communications is subject
to immediate expropriation. 9
Brazil now has far fewer prohibitions on foreign investment than does
Argentina. Foreigners are barred only from owning land in frontier areas
and from participation in the communications media."' Other than a few
minor restrictions such as a limit to the amount of rural acreage that can
be bought up by foreigners, and the requirement that at least one-third of
the stock of domestic airlines and coastal shipping companies be owned by
Brazilians, foreigners are able to invest in virtually anything in Brazil."'
2. Restrictions on Profit Remittances
The rate at which profits on new foreign investment in Argentina may
be remitted is to be set by the investment contract with the Argentine
Government. But in no event may it exceed the greater of: (a) an annual
rate of 12.5 percent; or (b) four percentage points above the interest rate
paid by the leading banks on term deposits of 180 days or less.", Profits
which exceed the remittable rate must be permanently reinvested in Ar-
gentina."3 Previous foreign investment which investors do not agree
"voluntarily" to register and be governed by the regime applicable to new
investment is subject to a special surtax ranging up to 40 percent on repa-
triable capital. Similarly, all licensing and know-how agreements involving
foreign remittances must be registered; those involving disproportionate
royalties or other undesirable features may be denied registration."'
Brazilian law subjects all foreign investors whose profit remittances
average more than 12 percent per year on registered capital over a three-
year period to a steep supplemental income tax."' In theory, profit remit-
tances are limited to 8 percent of registered capital for firms producing
fade-out provision, which would require the concern be converted into one controlled by
Argentine capital, within one year of the date the contract is to terminate. Decree No. 413 of
Feb. 22, 1974, art. 14 (Argen.). An English translation of this decree appears in 13 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1170 (1974).
109. Law No. 20.577 of Nov. 7, 1973, art. 20 (Argen.).
110. See B. CARL, A GUIDE TO INCENTIVES FOR INVESTING IN BRAZIL 11 (1972). See also
BRAZILIAN EMBAssy, A GUIDE TO INVESTING IN BRAZIL 9-10 (1967).
111. BRAZILAN EMBAssY, supra note 110, at 9. However, in some instances investment must
be via the formation of a Brazilian corporation, but the stock may be owned by non-resident
aliens.
112. Law No. 20.577 of Nov. 7, 1973, art. 13 (Argen.). But the right to reinvest dividends
is lost if a foreign firm voluntarily accepts special promotional arrangements in Argentina.
Id. at art. 18.
113. Id. at art. 15.
114. Law No. 19.231 of Sept. 10, 1971, regulated by Decree 6187 of Dec. 22, 1971.
115. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 43 (Braz.), as modified by Law No. 4.390 of Aug.
29, 1964 (Braz.). An English translation of this law appears in P. GARLAND, A BUSINESSMAN'S
INTRODUCTION TO BRAZILIAN LAW AND PRACTICE 153 (1966).
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luxury goods and services. However, no regulation defining "luxury" has
ever been issued, and this restriction has remained a dead letter."' The
only other serious limitation on remittances is the prohibition of royalty
payments on patents or trademarks if the payor is a branch of a foreign
company or the payee is a non-Brazilian which controls the Brazilian
payor.Y
7
3. Restrictions on Capital Repatriation
Argentina's new foreign investment statute prohibits all repatriation of
capital for the first five years of a new investment."' Thereafter, repatria-
tion is to be governed by the investment contract; however, in no event
may it exceed 20 percent a year, or be so large as to impede the continued
operation of the company."' In the event of a balance of payments crisis,
all capital repatriation may be temporarily suspended.'
m
Brazil does not restrict repatriation of capital. However, should there be
a balance of payments crisis, profit remittances and capital repatriation
may be limited to 10 percent of registered capital.'
4. Restrictions on Borrowing
Argentina's new foreign investment law requires that a maximum limi-
tation on short-term domestic borrowing be fixed in the investment con-
tract.'2 Foreign borrowings by foreign investors operating in Argentina
require authorization of the Central Bank, and the effective interest rate
may not exceed by more than two percentage points the going rate for
similar loans to prime borrowers in the country of the currency lent.z3
Moreover, foreign loans may not be guaranteed by any bank, unless the
loan was obtained from an international financing agency to which Argen-
tina belongs,2 ' and any penalties incurred through the fault of the foreign
investor shall be deducted from repatriable capital.'"
All loans in foreign currency in Brazil require prior approval of the Cen-
tral Bank, which may treat as repayment of principal interest that it
considers excessive in view of prevailing rates in the country of origin of
116. P. GARLAND, DOING BusmNSS IN AND WrrH BRAzt. 99 (1971).
117. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 14, as modified by Law No. 4.390 of Aug. 29, 1964.
118. Law No. 20.577 of Nov. 7, 1973, art. 12(c) (Argen.).
119. Id. at arts. 12(a) & (b).
120. Id. at art. 16.
121. Law No. 4.131 of Sept. 3, 1962, art. 28 (Braz.), as modified by Law No. 4.390 of Aug.
29, 1964 (Braz.). This standby power has never been invoked.
122. Law No. 20.577 of Nov. 7, 1973, art. 17 (Argen.).
123. Id. at art. 26.
124. Id. at art. 25(a).
125. Id. at art. 25(b).
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the loan. 2 Balance of payments and credit control considerations have led
the Central Bank to discourage foreign borrowing by requiring a compul-
sory deposit of 40 percent of the value of the loan and a minimum term of
ten years on all loans not guaranteed by the Brazilian government.'2 And,
though it has never utilized it, the Central Bank has the power during
periods of balance of payments disequilibria to restrict the access of com-
panies with foreign capital to Brazilian sources of credit.,"
D. "Special" Expropriations
An important part of the expropriation picture, especially for the foreign
investor, lies outside the constitutional and statutory provisions regulating
expropriation. A number of expropriations or confiscations of the property
of foreigners, as well as nationals, has been effectuated through special
legislation or decree, or has been disguised as a bona fide regulatory mea-
sure. Generally, when this has happened, the courts and the regular formal
legal system have not been irrelevant, but neither have they been of con-
trolling importance. Such investment disputes have been highly politi-
cized, and their ultimate resolutions have turned more on political and
economic variables than upon juridical issues. In a few cases court deci-
sions have been critical, but in most cases satisfactory settlements have
been negotiated outside of the courts.
1. The Vargas and Per6n Dictatorships
Dictators tend to be fickle in their regard for constitutional rights. Getdi-
lio Vargas, who governed Brazil from 1930 to 1945, and Juan Domingo
Per6n, who governed Argentina from 1945 to 1955,125 were not exceptions
in this respect. Constitutional guarantees of person and property were
frequently disregarded during the first Vargas and Per6n eras.
Both Vargas and Per6n resorted to thinly-disguised subterfuges to con-
fiscate estates of wealthy French nationals. Vargas appropriated the estate
of Paul de Leuze, a French newspaper owner, whose sole heir was his
126. P. GARLAND, supra note 116, at 101. Generally, the Central Bank has registered foreign
loans expeditiously, and has been realistic about the true cost of money in the international
market. Id. at 100-01.
127. The 40 percent deposit requirement was dropped by Central Bank Resolution No. 279
of Feb. 7, 1974. The 10 year minimum term requirement has recently been reduced to 5 years.
Busmess LATIn AMERICA, Sept. 18, 1974.
128. Law No. 4.728 of July 14, 1965, art. 22 (Braz.).
129. The dictatorial reigns of Vargas and Per6n were ended in 1945 and 1955, respectively,
by military coups. Curiously, both men staged comebacks at the polls. Vargas was constitu-
tionally elected President of Brazil in 1950 and governed until 1954, when he committed




nephew. This was accomplished by enactment of a statute retroactively
disinheriting any nephew claiming as an heir, thereby producing an es-
cheat.30 Acting partly out of personal pique, Per6n in 1948 launched an
attack on the "Bemberg group," a large industrial and landholding com-
plex owned by the estate of Otto Bemberg who, like de Leuze, had been a
French national. The heirs of the estate were charged with tax evasion and
fined more than $10,000,000, an unprecedented sum in the annals of Ar-
gentine tax collection. The group was also alleged to have violated the
antitrust laws by monopolizing the beer industry. Special legislation was
enacted ordering liquidation of many of the group's companies and
ranches.'3' Any compensation due was offset by tax claims. These proper-
ties, valued at more than $100 million, were restored to their former owners
in 1959 by the Frondizi Government.'
Per6n launched a similar attack against Argentina's foremost news-
paper, La Prensa. In 1946, that paper, along with La Naci6n (another
leading daily), were charged with customs fraud for printing advertise-
ments on duty-free newsprint. Two years later, the papers were required
to pay retroactive duty back to 1939. In October of 1948, the government
confiscated 8,055 tons of La Prensa's newsprint, pleading a paper shortage.
When the paper remained defiantly independent, Per6n, utilizing the
transparent guise of a labor dispute, "expropriated" La Prensa. A congres-
sional committee set compensation specially at $1,366,915, for a plant
valued by its owners at $20,458,650. However, not even the $1,366,915 was
paid, for more than $5,000,000 was assessed in retroactive import duties
and severance pay." La Prensa was also restored to its former owners by
the Frondizi government.
These are by no means the only instances of confiscation carried out by
the former Per6n regime. Since the entire judiciary was purged, 3 1 condem-
nation awards were occasionally set at ridiculously low levels by corrupt
or intimidated judges. Even today the Argentine courts are still trying to
undo the confiscations perpetrated under the guise of lawful expropriations
during the first Per6n era.'
130. K. LOEWENSTEiN, BRAZm UaEnz VAROAS 321-23 (1942).
131. Decree 9.997 of 1948 (Argen.); Law 14.122 of July 3, 1952 (Argen.). See generally N.Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1049 at 9, col. 6; id., Mar. 19, 1950, at 16, col. 1; id., Dec. 29, 1951, at 3, col.
3; id., July 3, 1952, at 34, col. 4; id., Aug. 28, 1954, at 19, col. 3.
132. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1959, at 24, col. 6.
133. G. BLANKSTEN, PERdN'S ARGENTiNA 211-13 (1953).
134. An incisive account of the demoralization of the Argentine judiciary under Per5n by
a former Supreme Court justice is Orgaz, Poder Judicial, in ARGcE'rA 1930-1960, at 124 (J.
Paita ed. 1961).
135. E.g., Campbell Davidson, Juan C. v. Prov. de Buenos Aires, 279 Falios 54, 11 J.A.
231 (1971) (expropriation set aside because of removal of judges, threats by the governor
against the expropriated party, and the ridiculously low value placed on the property by a
court to which two ex-labor judges were added).
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2. Public Utility Expropriations
Since World War H, foreign-owned public utilities have been buffeted
by a wave of nationalizations throughout Latin America.' 0 Argentina and
Brazil have been prominent among the buffeters. Thirty years ago nearly
all their utilities were foreign-owned; today most have been nationalized.
During the transition process some of these utilities were subjected to
such harrassment and profit-squeezing that expropriation appeared like an
act of euthanasia. The public utilities were the victims of a combination
of economic and political forces which, in many cases, led to sales under
duress (or quasi-duress) or expropriation pursuant to special legislation.
The rapid urbanization, import-substitution, and industrialization of the
post-World War II period placed unprecedented demands upon the public
utilities. Even with investment of huge sums in new plants and equipment,
satisfaction of all these demands would have been difficult. Such invest-
ment, however, was not forthcoming for essentially two reasons. One was
that the postwar period was a time of rising nationalism, which was fre-
quently manifested by outbursts directed against the most visible symbols
of foreign economic domination - the public utilities.'37 Fear of takeover
and fear of aggravating pressures for takeover made these companies reluc-
tant to risk new capital to expand their activities. The second reason was
diminishing profitability. Governments attempting to combat severe infla-
tion have a natural reluctance to concede rate increases to regulated indus-
tries.'" Rate-making legislation tended to be based upon the concept of
original cost in local currency, a value which eroded rapidly in the infla-
tionary spirals gripping the economies of Argentina and Brazil.' 3 Moreo-
ver, shortages of foreign exchange led to periodic devaluations that raised
the cost of imported fuel and remittance of profits. 4 ' The utilities tended
to respond to this situation by overloading, and by cutting back on reserve
136. See generally Bratter, Latin American Utilities'Nationalization Proceeds Inexorably,
66 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 1 (1960).
137. When Brazil's President Goulart suggested to President Kennedy that it was politi-
cally undesirable for United States companies to control Brazilian public utilities, Kennedy
reportedly agreed, commenting . . . "that every month, when the electric bill came due,
thousands of Brazilians were bound to think, 'It's that damned U.S. company.'" Quoted in
J. LEVINSON & J. DE ONmS, THE ALLIANCE THAT LOST ITS WAY 145 (1970).
138. Public utility prices in Argentina and Brazil were strikingly repressed in relation to
other prices. Taking 1935-38 in Argentina as a base of 100, by 1946.48 the price index level
for public utilities had fallen to 55. By 1952-55 utility prices had declined still further to 35.
C. DiAz AiLaANDO, supra note 92, at 322.
139. See, e.g., J. TENDLER, ELEcrouc POWER IN BRAZIL: ENTREPRENEURSHIIP IN THE PUiLIC
SECTOR 48 (1968). See also M. FINK et al., REPORTS ON ELEcRmc PowER REoULATxON IN BRAZIL,
CHinL, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, AND Mmco 41-42 (1960).
140. D. CAVERS & J. NELSON, ELECTRIC POWER REGULATION IN LArIN AMEIcA 6-7 (1959).
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capacities and maintenance.' The resulting deterioration in service
spurred nationalistic takeover demands.
Argentina. One of the key planks in Per6n's platform of economic inde-
pendence for Argentina was nationalization of the public utilities. Expiring
concessions, which had formerly been renewed as a matter of course, were
terminated and accompanied by purchase or expropriation of the conces-
sionaire's physical assets. During the mid-1940's, when foreign reserves
stood at record highs, Argentina could afford to buy out foreign investors
on relatively generous terms.' Thus, in September of 1946 Argentina
bought the United Telephone Company of the River Plate, a subsidiary of
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (ITT) for a little under
$95,000,000, paying cash in New York."' The following year, Per6n pur-
chased the British-owned railways for $600,000,000 in blocked sterling ac-
counts,' as well as three French-owned railways for approximately
$46,000,000.14
Prior to 1949, Argentine case law and doctrine were in agreement that
revocation of a public utility's concession required compensation for direct
damages plus lost profits.148 By 1949, this was no longer a rule with which
141. J. TENDLER, supra note 139, at 81-88; Bratter, supra note 136, at 5.
142. This is not to suggest that all foreign utilities were accorded generous treatment
during this period. Some were not. For example, the British.owned Compania Primitiva de
Gas de Buenos Aires was expropriated in 1944 through judicial proceedings. The government
originally deposited as compensation only 3,758,740 pesos for assets which vere admittedly
worth about five times as much. The government brazenly, if unsuccessfully, argued that a
municipal ordinance required the gas company to remove its equipment from municipal
property, and the cost of doing so should be deducted from the compensation owed. Gobierno
Nacional v. Cia. Primitiva de Gas de Buenos Aires, 35 La Ley 528,530 (Cam. Fed. de In Cap.
1944). The company ultimately received about half of what it claimed its property was worth.
N.Y. 'imes, Mar. 6, 1945, at 27, col. 4.
143. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1946, at 35, col. 5; id., Oct. 4, 1946, at 27, col. 7. ITT also agreed
to provide technical assistance for 10 years in exchange for a percentage of the profits of the
enterprise, and the right to sell technical telephone equipment through another subsidiary.
Business circles in the U.S. reportedly considered the settlement fair and adequate. Id., Sept.
29, 1946, at 35, col. 5. Spruille Braden, then U.S. ambassador to Argentina, has charged that
ITT made a payoff of $14 million to ensure such generous terms. A. SACPsoN, Tan SoMxo.n
STATE OFrIT 35 (1973).
144. The sale aroused mixed reactions in Britain. Some recalled that the railroads (for
which they were receiving 150,000,000 pounds) had cost 250,000,000 pounds to build and
500,000,000 to replace. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1947, at 28, col. 3. But most seemed content and
rail stocks rose on the news. Id., Feb. 13, 1947, at 12, col. 6.
145. L. GONzAT"z AGUAYO, supra note 84, at 133.
146. Oyhanarte, La Expropiaci6n de Empresas Concesionarias de Servicios Plblics, 70 La
Ley 809, 825 (1953). The "leading case" isF.F.C.C. deEntre Riosu. 1a Nacidn, 12 La Ley 18
(1936), which held, inter alia, that: (1) concessions may be modified or abrogated by the state,
but only upon payment of just compensation, and (2) that public utilities should be valued
in accordance with the earnings they generate during normal times. This case is commented
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the nationalizing Per6n regime could live. By then the economy had begun
to stagnate; in the previous three years, the country's foreign reserves had
fallen by 75 percent.' To reduce governmental outlays for public utility
nationalizations, the Per6nists inserted the following provisions into their
1949 Constitution:
. . . [P]ublic services belong ab origine to the State, and under
no circumstances may they be alienated or concessions granted
for their exploitation. Those which are in private hands shall be
transferred to the State via purchase or expropriation, with prior
compensation, whenever national law so determines.
The price for the expropriation of public service concessions
shall be the historical cost of the assets of the enterprise, less the
sums which have been amortized since the grant of the concession
and the sums in excess of a reasonable profit, which shall also be
considered as repayment of invested capital."8
While this provision appeared to invite expropriation of public' utilities
without compensation, the Argentine courts generally sought to minimize
its confiscatory effect. One technique was to limit its application to cases
which began and ended between 1949 and 1955.11 Since most expropriation
cases dragged on at least six years in the courts, this provision was ulti-
mately applied to few expropriations. A second technique was to define
original cost to include reinvested earnings.5 0 And a third technique was
to permit compensation for loss of the concession,' a holding justifiably
upon in considerable detail in 1 J. CAAsi, TRATADO TEomco PRAcnCO DE LA EXPROPLACION
Ph)B1JCA 318-32 (1967).
147. At the end of 1946, Argentina's gold and foreign exchange holdings (blocked and
unblocked) totalled $1,688,000,000. By the end of 1949, they had fallen to $370,000,000.
Computed from Table 73 in C. DiAz ALEJANDRO, supra note 92, at 486.
148. CONSTrrucION art. 40 (1949) (Argen.). A somewhat dubious defense, along with the
legislative history of Article 40, appears in Oyhanarte, note 146 supra.
149. In Prov. de Buenos Aires v. Cia. de Electricidad de Dolores (S.A.), [1959-VI] J.A.
258 (Sup. Ct. B.A.), the trial court had declared the expropriation of a subsidiary of the Swiss.
controlled Cia. Italo-Argentina de Electricidad without compensation on the theory that the
original cost of the investment had already been fully amortized. The Supreme Court of
Buenos Aires refused to sanction such confiscation, holding that the repealed Peronist Consti-
tution did not govern the expropriation, even though it had occured in 1952. The court
awarded compensation based upon the replacement cost at the time of the transfer of posses-
sion less depreciation.
In Ottonello Hnos. y Cia. v. Prey. de Tucumdn, 225 Fallos 451, 71 La Ley 172 (1953), the
Argentine Supreme Court refused to apply Article 40 of the 1949 Constitution to a concession
expropriated in 1944 because the case had been decided before the new constitution came
into force.
150. E.g., Prov. de Corrientes v. Cia. de Electricidad de Corrientes (S.A.), [1955-1] J.A.
47, 52 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
151. Id. at 53.
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criticized as inconsistent with the 1949 Constitution."
The expropriation of electric utilities, particularly those owned by Amer-
ican & Foreign Power Co. (AFPCO), the Swiss-controlled Compaila Italo-
Argentina de Electricidad, and the Belgian-based Sofina group, dragged
on throughout the first Per6n era. Between 1944 and 1956, the generating
capacity of AFPCO's Argentine plants was reduced by almost one-half as
a result of governmental takeovers.' In some cases compensation was
paid; in others it was merely promised. Not until Per6n had been deposed
was AFPCO able to negotiate a satisfactory settlement. In 1958 AFPCO
agreed to sell all of its remaining power interests to the Argentine
Government. Compensation was to be set by the Chief Justice of the Ar-
gentine Supreme Court. 5' In 1961, the Chief Justice, acting as an arbitra-
tor, fixed $53,632,000 as the compensation due, a sum regarded by the
company as "mildly disappointing."'' 15 A similar arrangement was reached
in 1958 for the Argentine Government to buy out the electric power inter-
ests of the Sofina group. "'
Brazil. Unlike Argentina, there have been only two major incidents in-
volving expropriation of foreign-owned public utilities in Brazil. Both took
place in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil's southern-most state, then governed
by Leonel Brizola, a charismatic leftist and brother-in-law of Jodo Goulart
(Brazil's president from 1961-1964). Both were finally settled out-of-court
through application of considerable economic and political pressure by the
U.S. Government.
In February of 1962, just prior to President Goulart's departure for
Washington to solicit aid to Brazil's crumbling finances, Brizola issued a
decree expropriating Rio Grande do Sul's telephone company, a subsidiary
of IT. The company had been in financial straits during the period pre-
ceding its expropriation because its rates were fixed by the state "at a level
which would not permit the recovery of depreciation, let alone a fair return
on investment."'5 The state of Rio Grande do Sul deposited $400,000 as
compensation for the telephone company, which had recently been valued
at $7,300,000 by agreement between two appraisers (one of whom had been
designated by Brizola himself) pursuant to an aborted plan to form a
"mixed" telephone company. 58
152. Spota, Expropiaci6n de la Empresa del Concesionario de Servicios Plblicos, [1955-
I] J.A. 48.
153. Bratter, supra note 136, at 6.
154. Id.
155. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1961, at 43, col.3.
156. Bratter, supra note 136, at 7.
157. Adair, Expropriation and Foreign Aid Funds, 69 PuB. UTU.. FoRT. 586, 589 (1962).
158. Id. at 589-91.
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This particular expropriation triggered a virulent reaction in the U.S.
Congress, which was antagonized by the coincidental request for financial
assistance for Brazil and the takeover of the ITT subsidiary. This annoy-
ance was manifested in the passage of the original Hickenlooper Amend-
ment, which required the President to suspend all foreign aid to any coun-
try expropriating the property of a U.S. company unless effective steps
were taken within six months to provide adequate compensation."'
Talks between Presidents Kennedy and Goulart aliout the ITT expropri-
ation led- to the issuance of a Brazilian decree, calling for nationalization
of the public utilities with compensation to be determined by "mutual
agreement and, when necessary, through expert evaluation and/or arbitra-
tion. . ... -"I Compensation was to be paid on a deferred basis: an initial
payment of not more than 10 percent, with the balance in installments
compatible with the resources of the utility. Moreover, the investor was to
assume an obligation to reinvest at least 75 percent of the indemnification
in priority sectors or activities in Brazil. 6' In 1963, ITT reached an interim
settlement on the basis of the 1960 appraisal, it received the equivalent of
$7,300,000 in cruzeiros, which it repatriated in dollars. It then reinvested
$4,650,000 in a Brazilian manufacturing subsidiary. In 1967, a final settle-
ment resulted in the sale of all 1'T telephone operations in Brazil for
approximately $12,000,000, about half of which was to be reinvested in
manufacturing telecommunications equipment in Brazil."2
The second major incidient in Rio Grande do Sul involved an electric
utility company, a subsidiary of AFPCO. In May 1959, Brizola issued a
decree expropriating the electric company, whose concession had expired
the previous year. The state immediately brought suit to obtain possession,
alleging urgency. In addition, the state offered to deposit the sum of one
cruzeiro on the theory that the company had excess earnings which wiped
out any compensation due. The trial court granted possession to the state,
but ordered the deposit increased to 20,000,000 cruzeiros (then about
$200,000). The company unsuccessfully appealed to the state's highest
court. While the company's appeal to the Supreme Federal Tribunal was
pending, the court-appointed appraiser valued the firm's assets at
2,568,121,600 cruzeiros (then about $26,000,000).111 At this point, the state
159. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1970), as amended, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(1) (supp. 1974).
160. Decree No. 1106 of May 30, 1962, art. 3 (Braz.). An English translation of the Decree
appears in 1 INT'L LEGAL MATERtALs 124 (1962).
161. Id. at art. 2(c).
162. H. STEnqR & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMs 340-41 (1968).
163. Adair, supra note 157, at 587-88. The appraisers found that the imported components
of the plant had a value of $4,761,900, while the local components had a value of 2,091,931,600
cruzeiros. They converted the dollar figure into cruzeiros at the rate of 100 cruzeiros to a
dollar, the official rate prevailing in 1959 and 1960. Had the free market rate prevailing at
the time of the taking, 132.5 to the dollar, been used, the valuation would have been about
$19.5 million. Id. at 588.
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made no effort to pay any compensation, adopting the tactic, so often
employed in Brazil during the period, of waiting for inflation to scale down
the sum to more manageable proportions.''
In the meantime, in August of 1962 Pernambuco, a state in Brazil's
Northeast, expropriated another subsidiary of AFPCO, and other state
governors indicated that they had plans to follow suit. After another meet-
ing between Presidents Kennedy and Goulart in April of 1963, AFPCO
reached an agreement under which Brazil would purchase all of the com-
pany's Brazilian electric utilities for $135,000,000. One-fourth of this sum
was to be paid in dollars with interest over a twenty-two year period, and
the remainder was to be reinvested in Brazil. However, political pressures
from the left and the right prevented Goulart from honoring the agree-
ment. '
The leaders of the military coup which overthrew Goulart in 1964 were
offered substantial economic assistance by the United States Govern-
ment, contingent, inter alia, upon honoring of the agreement with AFPCO.
In contradistinction to its predecessor, the new Brazilian regime welcomed
foreign investment. It asked AFPCO to remain and promised it an ade-
quate return on investment.'8 The company, however, had decided to
withdraw from the power business in Brazil. A modified agreement,
rammed through a purged, but still reluctant Brazilian Congress, retained
the $135,000,000 price but modified the terms of payment. A down pay-
ment of $10,000,000 in cash was made, and the balance was paid in two
promissory notes: one for $10,250,000 payable over a 45-year period at 6.5
percent interest, and the other for $24,750,000 payable from 1968 to 1989
at 6 percent interest."7 The president of AFPCO termed the settlement
"fair and reasonable," though he also stated that "anything we receive
would be better than we've been getting."'"
The Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Co., a Canadian holding com-
pany whose shares are about 36 percent U.S.-owned,"' has continued in
the electric utility business in Brazil. Though it sold several of its tele-
phone subsidiaries to the Brazilian Government in 1966 upon condition
that it reinvest at least 75 percent of the proceeds in Brazil,'7 ' the Canadian
company continues to supply Rio and Sdo Paulo with electricity, having
164. See Rosenn, supra note 46, at 861.
165. J. LEVINSON & J. DE ONuS, supra note 137, at 145.
166. Id. at 145-46.
167. Contract for the Sale of American & Foreign Power Company Properties in Brazil of
Nov. 12, 1964, 4 INT'L LEGAL MArERiAIs 72 (1965).
168. P. ImUCH, THE PROTECTON OF FOREIGN NvEsmENr 142 (1965).
169. Another 25 percent is held by Canadians, and the remainder is in bearer shares held
primarily in Europe. J. TEMLER, supra note 139, at 30.
170. H. STNEn & D. VAGTS, supra note 162, at 341.
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achieved a satisfactory working relationship with the state companies con-
trolling the generating facilities.'
3. Extractive Industry Concessions
Control over mineral and oil resources has had a long career as a political
soccer ball in Argentina and Brazil. There are few issues which can match
the intense nationalistic sentiments generated by debate on exploitation
of petroleum and mineral deposits by foreign capital. Perhaps in no other
area is Latin American ambivalence over foreign investment so clearly
reflected than in the extractive industries. It is not surprising, therefore,
that two of the most intractable foreign investment disputes have involved
oil in Argentina and iron ore in Brazil.
The Argentine Oil Contracts. Since the 1930's, Argentine oil production
had been largely in the hands of Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF),
a governmental corporation with a statutory monopoly. Though private
companies had previously received concessions, all new exploration and
development were reserved for YPF. But despite the existence of adequate
reserves, YPF lacked the resources to increase production enough to keep
pace with Argentina's rapidly expanding demand. Consequently,
increased oil imports began to exert serious balance of payments pressures
in the early 1950's.172
By 1954, the intensity of these pressures was enough to cause Per6n to
subordinate his nationalist sentiments and begin negotiations with Ameri-
can oil companies. The following year, a contract with a subsidiary of
Standard Oil of California was signed according the company extensive
rights to explore and develop nearly 50,000 square kilometers of Argentina.
While the contract was still being vigorously debated in the Legislature,
Per6n was deposed by the military. The contract was never imple-
mented.
,7 3
One of the most outspoken critics of the contract with Standard Oil was
Arturo Frondizi, who became President of Argentina in 1958. Once in
office, Frondizi quickly jettisoned his previous opposition to foreign oil
companies operating in Argentina, and instructed YPF to negotiate se-
cretly a series of contracts with private oil companies.' By 1963, ten
171. See J. TENDLER, supra note 139. In November of 1964 the military government resolved
the rate problem by issuing three executive decrees providing for automatic inflation adjust-
ments in rates and capital accounts. Id. at 44.
172. Edwards, The Frondizi Contracts and Petroleum Self-Sufficiency in Argentina, in
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 157, 161 (R. Mikesell ed.
1971).
173. Id. at 162.
174. Id. at 163.
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contracts were concluded, only two of which were with Argentine compa-
nies. 
5
The contracts, which obligated the companies to spend large sums for
the exploration and extraction of oil in return for guaranteed sales at a
fixed price to YPF, caused immediate political controversy. Despite un-
deniable success in stimulating Argentine oil production, opponents
charged that the contracts were illegal, that they had been procured dis-
honestly, and that they unduly favored the foreign oil companies at the
expense of Argentine patrimony. '
Frondizi was deposed by a military coup in 1962. The following year
Arturo illia was elected to the presidency. He promptly carried out his
campaign pledge to revoke the oil contracts. On November 15, 1963, Illia
issued a decree canceling the contracts but saying nothing about compen-
sation to the companies.'" Accordingly, the Solicitor of the Treasury filed
a complaint against each of the oil companies in the Federal Civil and
Commercial Court of Buenos Aires.' 8 The complaint sought a declaration
of the legal effects of cancellation of the contracts and an accounting of the
sums due all parties.7 In the meantime, the companies continued to man-
age and operate their wells. When the government failed to press its suit,
some of the oil companies fied a suit for a type of preliminary injunction
to preserve the status quo as a means of protecting their installations from
governmental intervention. Though unsuccessful in the trial court, the
companies prevailed on appeal. The court of second instance held that the
contractual rights of the oil company were constitutionally protected,3
and that in the absence of a regular expropriation proceeding, the com-
pany's possession of its physical property would be protected by court
order.'
In the meantime, the Argentine Government appointed a committee to
try to negotiate settlements with the oil companies. The desire to settle
stemmed from several constraints on the country. First, Argentina was not
prepared to invest the capital and technology necessary to increase produc-
tion in the contract areas. Oil production in the fields operated directly by
175. 2 A. CHAYEs, T. EHRUCH, & A. LOvENFELD, b r-MATONAL LEGAL PRoczss 826-27
(1969) [hereinafter cited as 2 A. CHAYES].
176. Id. at 826; Comment, supra note 7, at 2082-83.
177. Decree No. 744/63 of Nov. 15, 1963 (Argen.). An English translation appears in 3 IW-r'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1964).
178. See id. at art. 6.
179. An English translation of the complaint appears in 3 IT'rL LEGAL MMzAxRLS 112
(1964).
180. The Court relied primarily on CoNsTrruaON art. 17 (1853, as amended 1866, 1898.
1957) (Argen.).
181. Gobierno Nacional v. Pan American Oil Co., [1965-IV J.A. 78 (Cam. Fed. Cap. Sala
Civ. y Com. 1965).
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YPF had declined in 1964, and it became increasingly apparent that some
kind of arrangement with international oil interests would have to be
worked out if Argentina were to meet her ever-increasing needs for petro-
leum. Second, though the United States never invoked the terms of the
Hickenlooper Amendment, which was itself amended with Argentina spe-
cifically in mind, there were threats to do so."82 Third, there were strong
doubts on the part of key members of the Illia Administration about the
legality of some of the contract annulments.'1
The first settlement, announced in January of 1965, was with Astra,
a German-Argentine firm. In exchange for all the wells drilled by Astra,
YPF agreed to pay Astra the amount of its original investment, plus 15
percent on that investment prior to the annulment of the contract. Pay-
ment was to be made in promissory notes bearing 6.5 percent interest
and payable in full in four years."" The second group to settle was
Continental-Marathon, which had agreed to assume the risks of explora-
tion and had found no oil. Marathon sought no compensation and was
satisfied with a court-approved settlement which stated that the company
had carried out its contract honorably.8 5 All but three of the other compa-
nies settled later in 1965. With some minor variations, the settlement
formula called for restitution of original investment in the form of promis-
sory notes bearing interest at 6.50 to 6.75 per cent per year, and payable
in dollars or British pounds in monthly installments. The term of the
repayment varied from a low of nine years to high of 24 years. 80 None of
the settlements provided for renegotiation of the contracts to permit the
companies to continue operating in Argentina, though nothing prohibited
the companies from submitting bids on future contracts."'
By 1966, when the Illia Government was ousted by a military coup, only
the two largest claims, those of Cities Service and Pan American, remained
outstanding. During this time, Cities Service had actually been expanding
its production, while Pan American's production had fallen off by about
20 percent.' The new military regime welcomed foreign investment, and
182. Comment, supra note 7, at 2083-86. Though the United States did not formally sus-
pend aid to Argentina, disbursements were sharply reduced. 2 A. CHAYES, Supra note 176, at
861.
183. See Memorandum from the president of YPF to President Illia, translated in Ed-
wards, supra note 172, at 180-82. The adverse Court of Appeals decision also undermined the
government's legal position. Gobierno Nacional v. Pan American Oil Co., [1965-I J.A. 78.
184. Edwards, supra note 172, at 179.
185. Id.
186. The terms of the annulment agreements with Tennessee Gas, Esso, and Shell are
translated in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 103 (1966), 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1967), and 6
INT'L LEGAL MATEmALS 19 (1967), respectively.
187. Edwards, supra note 172, at 183.
188. 2 A. CHAYEs, supra note 175, at 868.
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was sharply critical of the Illia Government for annulling the oil contracts.
One immediate consequence of this change in the political climate was the
renegotiation of these two contracts on terms that permitted the compa-
nies to continue their oil operations in Argentina satisfactorily.N
Iron Ore in Brazil. During the 1950's, Hanna Mining Company acquired
52 percent of the stock of St. John d'el Rey, a British corporation that had
been engaged in gold mining operations in Brazil. In addition to its gold
mines, St. John owned nearly 100 square miles of adjacent land, which
contained rich iron ore deposits.' When Hanna proposed a joint venture
with European and American iron ore consumers to exploit these deposits,
intense nationalistic opposition was aroused. In June of 1960, one hundred-
twenty Brazilian deputies petitioned Brazilian President Kubitschek to
cease negotiations with Hanna, pending a congressional investigation.",
Responding to the increasing popular displeasure at the prospect of for-
eign exploitation of Brazilian iron ore, Janio Quadros, who assumed the
presidency in 1961, appointed two commissions to study Hanna's legal
position. When these commissions failed to establish sufficient basis for
challenging Hanna's title, a third commission was appointed. Some mem-
bers of this commission found that Hanna's predecessor in title, St. John
d'el Rey, had improperly registered the mineral deposits as mines since the
requirement that such deposits be worked was not met.'" The enigmatic
Quadros resigned after serving only six months of his term, and his succes-
sor, Jodo Goulart, was strongly opposed to permitting Hanna to exploit the
ore.
The Goulart regime soon entangled Hanna in a web of legal controversy.
In June of 1962, the Ministry of Mines and Energy cancelled registration
of the mining rights on mineral properties which Hanna intended to lease
to the joint venture's operating company. The Ministry also ordered the
immediate cessation of all mining activity and the execution of measures
to expropriate the surface land for the property of governmental corpora-
tions.
93
189. Edwards, supra note 172, at 184. The settlement with Cities Service is reproduced in
6 INT'L LEGAL MATRIALS 1073 (1967).
190. Mikesell, Iron Ore in Brazil: The Experience of the Hanna Mining Company, in
FOREIGN INVESTENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES 345, 346 (R. Mikesell ed.
1971).
191. N.Y. Times, June 14, 1960, at 59, col. 5.
192. See Vote of Minister Vitor Nunes Leal, in Unido Federal v. Coopanhia Novalimense
et outro, 88 R.D.A. 192, 232-33 (1966). See also Opinion of the Commission's Legal Consult-
ant, 89 R.D.A. 192-93 (1966).
193. The text of the dispatch issued over the name of Gabriel de Rezende Passos, Minister
of Mines and Engergy, appears at 89 R.D.A. 215. Professor Mikesell states that this dispatch
was actually issued a few days after Passo's death by his subordinates. Mikesell, supra note
190, at 355 n.19.
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Hanna promptly challenged the legality of the Ministry's actions in the
Brazilian courts. It emerged from the Federal Tribunal of Appeals in Sep-
tember of 1963 with a split decision. By a vote of 4-to-2, that court refused
to enjoin the cancellation of the mining rights; however, by a vote of 4-to-
3, the court held that the Brazilian Government could not order the cessa-
tion of mining and the expropriation of land surrounding the mineral de-
posits without instituting an administrative or judicial proceeding in
which the company would have the opportunity to defend its claims.114
Both the government and Hanna appealed to the Supreme Federal Tri-
bunal. While the appeals were pending before that court, four significant
events occured: (1) Goulart was ousted by a military coup;" 5 (2) the Pres-
ident of the new military government, Castello Branco, issued a decree
favoring private development of export minerals, including iron ore, by
both foreign and domestic firms;"' (3) Hanna and Cia. Auxiliar de Empre-
sas de Mineracdo (CAEMI), a Brazilian firm, agreed to a joint iron ore
mining venture in which CAEMI would own 51 percent of the shares;"7 and
(4) an "institutional act" was issued, permitting the government to add
five new members to the Supreme Federal Tribunal.' 8
When it finally decided the appeals, nearly three years after the decision
of the Federal Tribunal of Appeals, the Supreme Federal Tribunal split
four ways. Six of the ministers, including all of the new appointees sitting
on the case, voted to grant a writ of security'9 annulling all action taken
by the Ministry of Mines and Energy. 0 Only one minister agreed entirely
with the government's argument and voted to deny the writ of security on
the merits.20 ' Another voted to deny the writ of security on a procedural
ground.' Four ministers voted to deny the writ in part, leaving the cancel-
lation of the mining rights standing, but suspending any operative effect
pending further decision by the President of the Republic.25 ' Breaking the
194. Cia. de Mineragdo Novalimense v. Unido Federal, 76 R.D.A. 268 (1963).
195. See generally Brazilian Democracy Breaks Down: 1963-1964, in T. SKIDMORE, supra
note 33, at 253.
196. Mikesell, supra note 190, at 357-58.
197. Id. at 359-61.
198. Institutional Act No. 2, Oct. 27, 1965, art. 6 (Braz.).
199. The writ of security (mandado de seguranqa) is a uniquely Brazilian juridical institu-
tion, which combines into a single writ the effective characteristics of the Anglo-American
writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction. See Eder, Judicial Review in
Latin America, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 570, 582-84 (1960).
200. 89 R.D.A. at 246. Only three of the five newly appointed ministers sat on the Hanna
case. The other two excused themselves.
201. Vote of Hermes Lima, 89 R.D.A. at 227-31.
202. Vote of Evandro Lins, 89 R.D.A. at 221-27. Like a motion for summary judgment in
U.S. civil procedure, the writ of security is inappropriate if there is an underlying dispute of
fact. Minister Lins found that there was an unresolved factual issue.
203. Vote of the Reporter, Gonqalves de Oliveira, 89 R.D.A. at 209-17, and concurred with
by Ministers Vitor Nunes Leal, Vilas-Boas and Lafayette de Andrade.
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6-to-6 tie as to whether to grant the writ of security in toto, the President
of the Tribunal cast his vote with the bloc of four.2' The result of the
Supreme Federal Tribunal decision was to declare the cancellation decree
ineffectual and to remand the affair to the President of the Republic for
any further action he wished to take consistent with "due process."1 3
A few months after the Supreme Federal Tribunal's decision, President
Castello Branco issued a decree which rectified Hanna's right to mine the
iron ore on its properties.23 This presidential decree also cleared the way
for the new joint venture between Hanna and CAEMI to construct port and
transportation facilities.
4. Expropriation via the Bankruptcy Court: the Ominous Experience
of Deltec International in Argentina.
The recent experience of Deltec International in Argentina is an ominous
portent of the kind of treatment that multinationals may expect from
Argentine courts. The country's largest meat packing firm, Compafila
Swift de la Plata (a subsidiary of Deltec International Ltd., a Bahamas-
based holding company) found itself unable to pay its liabilities as they
became due. Swift's payment difficulties were characteristic of the indus-
try at that time, which had suffered heavy losses because of a shortage of
beef, a sharp rise in prices, and the government's imposition of restrictions
on the slaughtering of beef for domestic consumption. Government banks
extended credit to bail out national meat packers, but no such assistance
was extended to the foreign-owned packing firms.2
Swift, which was insolvent only in an equity sense," petitioned the
bankruptcy court for approval of a composition of its creditors. The pro-
posed arrangement called for payment of 100 percent on the principal of
its outstanding debts (then about $20,000,000) in four consecutive annual
installments of 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent, bearing
interest of twelve percent per annum.211 Despite approval of the arrange-
ment by 86 percent of the general creditors representing 85 percent of the
204. Vote of Ribeiro da Costa, 89 R.D.A. at 246-48.
205. That is to say, before the President of the Republic could cancel Hanna's mining
concessions, the company was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
206. Mikesell, supra note 190, at 356.
207. Id. at 359.
208. ERNST & ERNST, ARGENTINA: A NATIONAL PaornL 20 (1972); BusINEss IN A! ucA,
Sept. 26, 1973, at 305.
209. Based upon an evaluation made by the Argentine National Institute of Technology
(Universidad Tecnol6gica Nacional), the bankruptcy referee in September of 1971 valued the
assets of Swift at 556,223,360 new pesos, and the liabilities at 143,480,787 new pesos.
210. Brief on Appeal to the Federal Commercial Chamber, Companila Swift de la Plata,
Nov. 16, 1971, at 6 (abbrev. Eng. trans.).
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claims entitled to vote, 2 1 the bankruptcy judge, acting on the motion of a
single creditor with a claim of about $4,000, rejected the composition. 2"
Instead, he ordered Swift's liquidation and appointed the national govern-
ment as liquidator. In addition, the court pierced a parcel of corporate veils
and held all other Argentine corporations owned by Deltec contingently
responsible for the debts of Swfit.2 13 This was accompanied by a prohibition
pendente lite against Deltec's transfer of any of its other Argentine assets.
The bankruptcy court's opinion reads more like a political polemic than
a reasoned judicial analysis. It begins with the assumption that Swift is
part of "a unified structure of decision and interest, which makes it a single
unit, with the same and common profit motive," and it is therefore "neces-
sary to penetrate the corporate personality. 2 1 In two brief paragraphs, the
court suggests that the economic difficulties of Swift are largely due to its
merger with two other Deltec corporations, Armour and La Blanca, and in
making loans to other corporations in the Deltec group. It therefore con-
cludes that Swift "has been engaged in conduct incompatible with the
benefits of a composition and that an analysis of its conduct reveals that
it does not deserve to continue in business.
2 1 5
The real basis for the court's opinion comes in a later paragraph, in
which it points out:
• . . Swift is an Argentine extension of the multinational firms,
a species born . . . under the impulse of new systems of produc-
tion which eliminate national frontiers and generate new eco-
nomic powers. Because of the concentration and flexibility of
their resources, these firms are able to carry out autonomous
strategies, largely independent of national authorities . . . . In
the extension of their activities "these private organizations may
lead to a new, abusive form of economic domination. . . ." This
circumstance requires greater rigor in determining whether such
a corporation should survive when it becomes insolvent.
2
11
The court's solution was to order the "liquidation" of Swift. However,
"liquidation" is not used in the usual sense of the term; in this context it
means "nationalization" of the enterprise. Thus, the court's order directs
the liquidator to maintain present levels of employment, and borrowing a
page from the history of the first Per6n-era, suggests that the employees
211. Id.
212. Compafila Swift de La Plata, S.A., cony., 15 J.A. 350, 350-53, 146 La Ley 597, 601.04
(Nat'l Commercial Ct., 1972) (Lozada, J.).
213. Id. at 368, 146 La Ley at 612 (1972).
214. Id. at 350, 146 La Ley at 601.




might acquire the operating parts of the company.217
This decision by Judge Salvador Lozado caused Latin America, the
highly regarded London-based newsletter, to observe:
The Argentine authorities are horrified at any suggestion that
their action with regard to Swift is in any way similar to national-
izations by decision of executive or legislative branches of govern-
ment in other parts of Latin America. All that is involved, they
say, is a technical legal question. If the judge's decisions are
reversed in a higher court, such a version may be accepted, but
in the current climate of opinion in Argentina, this does not seem
likely. . . .If anyone doubts the eccentricity of Lozada's historic
decision (histdric for the precedents he set) they should study the
legal costs awarded against Swift; the lawyers who represented
the small creditor . . . are to receive 1,500,000 new pesos [about
$150,000] in court-awarded legal fees. It is presumably merest
coincidence that the lawyer in question was minister of justice
when Lozada was appointed to the bench.21 1
Sala C of the Federal Commercial Chamber sustained Lozada's decision
insofar as it denied confirmation of the composition and declared Swift's
bankruptcy."9 However, it reversed the piercing of Deltec's corporate veils
and the award of attorney's fees."' It also censured and fined the bank-
ruptcy judge for conceding newspaper and magazine interviews about the
case.2' The basis of the appellate court's more tempered opinion was that
the bankruptcy judge has broad discretion to reject arrangements which
he finds are not in the "public interest," and that there was evidence in
this case to support his determination. Such evidence was found in the
limitations on Swift's freedom of action as part of the Deltec group, and
particularly in its merger with two of the group's loss corporations at a time
when Swift was having financial difficulties of its own.2
Shortly after the appellate court handed down its decision, Argentina's
Minister of Justice, Ismael Bruno Quijano, was accused by Judge Lozada
217. Id.
218. 5 LATiN AmuCA 378 (1971).
219. Compaia Swift de La Plata, S.A., cony., 15 J.A. 353, 146 La Ley 604 (Nat'l Commer-
cial Ct., Ct. App. 1972).
220. Id. at 368, 146 La Ley at 612, 616.
221. 146 La Ley at 611.
222. Swift's Brief to the Supreme Court, at 54, points out that the Federal Commercial
Chamber was confused about the size of the balance sheet losses of these two companies. The
Court's opinion characterized the loss of La Blanca as more than 14 million pesos and that
of Armour at more than 27 million. The real amounts were apparently closer to 4 million and
9 million pesos, respectively. Moreover, the brief points out the assets were actually worth
more than four times book value, and there were sound business reasons for the mergers.
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of trying to influence his judgment in the Swift case. This publicity forced
the resignation of the Minister of Justice.m
While Swift's appeal was pending, the entire membership of the Su-
preme Court resigned in the wake of the election of a Per6nist regime. The
new regime promptly packed the Court with Per6nistas.24 In September
of 1973, the newly appointed Supreme Court reversed the Federal Com-
mercial Chamber in part and reinstated Judge Lozada's original deci-
sion.25 However, instead of imposing contingent liability on Deltec's Ar-
gentine subsidiaries for the debts of Swift, the Supreme Court character-
ized that liability as joint and several.228 The Supreme Court's theory,
declared a few weeks earlier in a case involving Parke, Davis & Co.,2" was
that a parent and its subsidiaries constitute a single "socio-economic unit"
and must be treated as a single juridical entity.22 The Supreme Court also
reinstated the award of attorney's fees of $150,000 to counsel for the small
creditor and remanded the case to Judge Lozada to ascertain which enti-
ties should be held jointly liable for Swift's debt.
Judge Lozada immediately issued bankruptcy orders against thirteen
Deltec subsidiaries and appointed intervenors to operate the companies.
Thus, Deltec presently finds itself in the position of having companies with
book values well over $100 million taken over by the Argentine courts to
secure the payment of $6,504,000 worth of unpaid debts by one of its
subsidiaries.m Whether these companies will be returned to Deltec or ex-
propriated pursuant to the general expropriation law remains to be seen.
At present, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Deltec has been the
victim of a thinly-disguised confiscation by a politically motivated denial
of justice in the Argentine courts.22
.'
223. 6 LArN AmzmcA 216 (1972). Deltec's board of directors in Argentina included Adalbort
Krieger Vasena, Minister of Economy from 1967 to 1969. To what extent the company used
or misused its political influence is unclear.
224. La Prensa, May 25, 1973, at 10, col. 1; La Prensa, June 9, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
225. Compania Swift de La Plate, S.A. Frigorifica, 19 J.A. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The Argen-
tine Supreme Court's opinion appears in the English translation in 6 LAW. OF THE AMEtIUcS
330 (1974) and is the subject of a comment by Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke
Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAw. OF THE AMmucAS 320 (1974); Case Note, 15 HARe. INT'L L.J.
528 (1974).
226. Compafiia Swift de La Plata, S.A. Frigorifica, 19 J.A. 576, 583 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
227. Parke Dfvis y Cia. de Argentina S.A., 19 J.A. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
228. Compafnla Swift de La Plata, S.A. Frigorifica, 19 J.A. 576, 582 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The
Supreme Court's opinion does not appear to rest upon factual findings that Deltec had abused
its corporate entities or had specifically harmed Argentine economic interests. The Court does
hint that its conclusion is necessary to prevent fraud, but the opinion fails to set out specific
fradulent acts. Whether the weakness of the opinion reflects merely the weakness of the case
or the Court, or both, is unclear.
229. Deltec International Limited, 1973 Annual Report, at 5.
229.1. In refusing to give extraterritorial effect to this Argentine bankruptcy decree, a U.S.
court observed:
.. . New York courts are not required to recognize foreign judgments which come




What lessons can be drawn from the above examination of the theory
and practice of expropriation law in Argentina and Brazil? And what con-
clusions can be drawn to guide present and prospective foreign investors
in those countries?
First, the eminent domain provisions of both countries deserve only fair
marks as mechanisms for promptly according the condemnee just compen-
sation. While recent changes permitting inflation adjustments have greatly
improved fairness, the "quick take" procedures (used in almost all cases),
combined with the lengthy delays built into the expropriation process,
often result in the payment of inadequate compensation many years after
the condemnee hag been deprived of his property. Moreover, the Argentine
eminent domain statute is unduly restrictive in denying compensation for
lost profits, good will, and, under certain circumstances, costs.
Second, many, though probably not all,23 of the purposes of expropria-
tion can be constitutionally achieved without compensation by a combina-
tion of regulation and taxation. Taxes can be raised to confiscatory levels,
and artful drafting of categories of taxpayers can conceal arbitrary discrim-
ination. Redistribution of income from business to employees can be ac-
complished by means of labor legislation. Rent and price controls can be
used to eliminate profits, and utility rates can be set so low that they
achieve a similar effect. The foreign investor can be deprived of the fruits
of his investment by means of profit remittance and capital repatriation
limitations, as well as exchange controls. Violations of criminal statutes
may be used to trigger constitutionally valid confiscations.ni Finally, as
Deltec's experience demonstrates, even bankruptcy laws can be bent to
disguise confiscation. While the use of such policy instruments to cloak
confiscations has been relatively rare in Argentina and Brazil, past experi-
ence suggests that their municipal counts offer inconsistent and unreliable
protection against such activity.
that plaintiff is Bankrupt because it is one segment of a chain of corporations,
one of which is insolvent, may under our laws amount under certain circumstan-
ces to a confiscation of property.,
Deltec Banking Corp., Ltd. v. CompanlaItalo Argentina de Electricidad, S.A., N.Y.L.J., Apr.
3, 1974, at 18, cols. 1 & 2, aff'd mem., 46 App. Div. 2d 847, 362 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Ist Dep't 1974).
230. One dominant motivation of expropriation is the felt political need to claim national
ownership. To the extent that even bare legal title is left with the foreign investor, such
motivation is frustrated. Another motivation may be to reallocate capital, which may be more
difficult to accomplish by regulation and taxation. See Axelrod & Mendlovitz, Expropriation
and Underdeveloped Nations: The Analogy of U.S. Constitutional Law, in ESAys o.N
EXPROPRIATMON 83, 86-87 (R. Miller & . Stranger eds. 1967).
231. Despite constitutional language striking confiscation forever from the Argentine Penal
Code, the Argentine Supreme Court upheld the confiscation of Perdn's "illicitly acquired"
property by special decree immediately after his ouster. Perdn, Juan Domingo, [1957-I]]]
J.A. 62 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
1975]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Both countries have long traditions of relatively independent judiciaries,
which have tended to take seriously their role as protectors of constitu-
tional rights against governmental infringement. Unfortunately, the inde-
pendence and vigor of the courts of both Argentina and Brazil have been
seriously undermined in recent years by clashes with the constituted, duly
or otherwise, political authorities. Since the end of World War II, the
Argentine Supreme Court has been arbitrarily impeached en masse once,
arbitrarily dismissed en masse twice, and politically motivated to resign
en masse once. 2 Between 1965 and 1969, the Brazilian Supreme Federal
Tribunal has been both packed and unpacked to ensure compliance with
the aims of de facto military governments.m This is not to suggest that the
Argentine and Brazilian courts have become mere rubber stamps for the
Executive; they have not. But their independence has been decidedly re-
duced in the past decade, and the protection accorded to basic constitu-
tional rights, such as liberty of movement and freedom of speech, has been
decidedly restrained.24 Nor has the return of constitutional government to
Argentina resulted in increased judicial independence; present indications
are that the Peronists are once again engaged in a pattern of conduct
designed to undermine the independence of the Argentine judiciary."'
Third, the constitutional and statutory provisions governing expropria-
tion have generally not been of decisive importance in resolving the major
foreign investment disputes in Argentina and Brazil. Most of these have
been resolved by negotiated, extra-judicial settlements. Such settlements
have generally been influenced more by external and domestic, political
and economic factors than by legal considerations. Despite constitutional
guarantees of prior compensation, such settlements have frequently in-
volved long-term payouts, and have sometimes required the reinvestment
of a substantial portion in a less sensitive sector of the economy. Consider-
ing the magnitude of the sums involved in relation to existing foreign
currency reserves, Argentina and Brazil have generally negotiated fair set-
tlements of these disputes.
232. A Per6n-dominated Congress impeached the entire Supreme Court in 1946 for hav-
ing invalidated several statutes and released numerous political prisoners. See Leonhard, The
1946 Purge of the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice, 17 INTER-Am. ECON. AFFARS, Spring
1964, at 73. In 1957, after Per6n's ouster, the Lonardi provisional government summarily
dismissed the entire Supreme Court. The process was repeated in 1966 after the military coup
that brought General Ongania to power. See generally INSTTrro DE CIENciA POLTICA, LA
REVOLUcI6N ARGENTINA (1966). In the wake of a Peronist electoral victory, in May of 1973 the
entire Supreme Court resigned. See note 224 supra.
233. Rosenn, Judicial Review: Old and New, 81 YALE L.J. 1411, 1419-20 (1972).
234. See Carl, Erosion of Constitutional Rights of Political Offenders in Brazil, 12 VA. J.
INT'L L. 157 (1972); Steiner & Trubek, Brazil-All Power to the Generals, 49 FoR. Arr. 464
(1971); Tyson, Economic Growth and Human Rights in Brazil: The First Nine Years of
Military Tutelage, 67 PROCEEDINGS Am. Soc. INT'L L. 208, 209-10 (1973); 35 BULL. INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS, Sept. 1968, at 13. See also Bidart Campos, La Intervenci6n Federal al Poder
Judicial de la Provincia de Santa Fe, 131 La Ley 1287 (1968).
235. See La Prensa, March 25, 1974, at 4, cols. 1-2; id., Apr. 16, 1974, at 4, cola. 1-2.
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Both nations, like all other Latin American countries, have resisted
pressures to subscribe to the World Bank Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes.28 However, investment guaranty agreements per-
mitting the U.S. Government to insure the foreign investor against certain
risks have been in existence since 1959 for Argentina and since 1965 for
Brazil. 7 Given the strength of nationalistic currents hostile to foreign
investment, such insurance is advisable.
Lastly, nationalistic resentment of foreign investment has deep political
roots in both Argentina and Brazil. Brazilian hostility towards foreign
investment has been largely repressed since Goulart's ouster in 1964,
though there is a sizeable group of nationalistic junior army officers favor-
ing more state ownership of the means of production, and complaints
about "de-nationalization" of Brazilian industries are widespread. A for-
eign investment law may also be soon introduced by the Geisel regime,
which took office in March of 1974.2 However, the creation of Petrobras,
the state oil monopoly, before foreign oil companies were granted oil explo-
ration concessions, has prevented oil from becoming the emotional issue
that it is in Argentina. Moreover, nationalism in Brazil has tended to be
more restrained and less xenophobic than in some of its Hispanic neigh-
bors. Consequently, the Brazilian ambiente is far more favorable for for-
eign investment than that prevailing in most parts of Latin America.
Argentine nationalism, which had begun to re-emerge well before the
Per6nist electoral victories in 1973, "1 was accentuated by Per6n's return
to power. It is still too early to assess the implications of Per6n's recent
death upon Argentine nationalism. At the time of his demise, Perdn
seemed torn between the left and right wings of his political movement,
between a desire to attract more foreign investment, albeit on his terms,
and a desire to nationalize key sectors of the economy. His new foreign
investment law and the Deltec affair were hardly calculated to encourage
foreign investment, though the former at least has the virtue of screening
236. See Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. LN'r'L
L. 256 (1971).
237. Guaranty of Private Investments Agreement with Argentina, Dec. 22, 1959, [19611 1
U.S.T. 955, T.I.A.S. 4799 (effective May 5, 1961). The initial Agreement provides a guaranty
against inconvertibility, but an amended protocol providing for expropriation, war, and civil
strife guarantees was executed on June 5, 1963; though the latter has been implemented, it
has never been ratified and is thus only provisionally in force. U.S. TRAinEs tN FoRca 5 (1972).
However, the new Argentine Foreign Investment Law subverts the entire agreement by deny-
ing entry to any foreign investor whose potential claims against the Argentine government
are subrogated to foreign states or international organizations. See note 108 supra. Because
of nationalistic opposition, the Investment Guaranty Agreement with Brazil was not signed
until Sept. 17, 1965, more than a year after Goulart's ouster, and the Brazilian Senate made
one important reservation. See note 6 supra.
238. See Busniss LATN AMumcA, March 27, 1974, at 97.
239. Since June of 1970 there has been growing hostility to foreign investment manifested
in legislation, the press, and the courts. See Dabinovic, Foreign Investments: Politics and
International Law, 5 LAw. oF THE AxmcAs 10 (1973).
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out undesirable foreign investments and thereby reducing potential
sources of investment disputes.
There have already been a number of nationalizations of foreign invest-
ment in recent months in Argentina. The expropriation of five foreign-
owned banks in September of 1973 has produced a serious dispute about
the terms of compensation. 4 ' In October of 1974, Per6n's widow decreed
the "Argentinisation" of the foreign-owned telephone companies, includ-
ing the subsidiaries of Siemens and ITT, as well as the Italo-Argentine
Electric Co. (CIADE).
24'
Even more discouraging to foreign investment in Argentina is the gov-
emnment's apparent inability to prevent the kidnapping of executives, both
foreign and national, by leftist guerillas. In the past fifteen months, com-
panies doing business in Argentina have had to pay out approximately
$50,000,000 in ransom to secure return of their personnel.2 12 The number
of U.S. executives in Buenos Aires has fallen from 1000 to about 300 in the
past year because of terrorist activities. 42 Until companies are no longer
being deprived of property by threats of force, and a climate of personal
security is restored, constitutional and statutory measures regulating ex-
propriation will remain secondary considerations to the foreign investor,
240. Law No. 20.522 (Argen.). Rather than permit compensation to be set by the courts,
the Argentine government has reportedly set compensation for the former bank owners by
governmental decree on a take it or take nothing basis. Chase Manhattan has denounced the
compensation offered to it as "considerably below what we would consider fair value." Wall
St. Journal, April 19, 1974, at 3, col. 4.
241. 8 LATIN AMERiCA 330 (1974); La Prensa, Oct. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
242. NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1974, at 52.
243. Bus. WEEK, Mar. 9, 1974, at 40; U.S. Naws & WoRLD REP., Mar. 11, 1974, at 59.
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